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Africa's problems are myriad and complex. However, most scholars of
Africa agree that one particular issue that continues to bedevil African countries
is how to establish democratic nation-states with institutions that promote
economic development, consolidate political harmony and stability, and avoid
conflicts through enfranchisement. Many parts of Africa have thus far failed to
develop democratic institutions and modes of conducting public affairs.' As a
result, Africa has been strife-tom for most of the post-colonial era. Rwanda, for
example, was the scene of the world's biggest genocidal massacre in half a
2
century. The Liberian conflict has been going on for over twelve years and
affected its neighbors and an entire region.' Africa has the largest share of
conflicts in the world today.4 Specifically,
[s]ince 1970, more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa,
the vast majority of them intra-State in origin. In 1996 alone,
14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed
conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related
deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million
refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences
of those conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts
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1. See Hopeless Africa, THE ECONOMIST, May 13-19, 2000, at 17.
2. See generally ALISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY, GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999).
See also Douglas Anglin, Rwanda Genocide Revisited: The Military Options-What Could and Should the
International Community Have Done? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
3. See generally U.N. Dep't Pub. Info., Conflict Diamonds: Sanctions and War, at http://www.un.org/
peace/africa/Diamond.html [hereinafter Conflict Diamonds].
4. See The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Substantial Development in
Africa: Report of the Secretary-General, at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/report.htm
[hereinafter Causes of Conflict].
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to ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its
peoples.5
Conflicts in Africa have typically been rooted in struggles for political
power, ethnic privilege, national prestige, and scarce resources.6 Currently, the
vast majority of disputes are domestic in origin.7 Often, even interstate
conflicts are reflections of domestic politics." Governments going through
difficult times commonly intervene in conflicts in neighboring states as a means
of deflecting public anger away from themselves. 9 As a result of the numerous
conflicts raging in Africa, it remains host to the largest population of refugees
and displaced persons of any continent.l0 Too many Africans are trapped in
conditions of grinding poverty, face daily violence and abuse, suffer under
corrupt and oppressive regimes, and are condemned to live their lives in
squatter settlements or rural slums with inadequate sanitation, schooling, and
health facilities. All of these factors contribute to conflict, poverty, instability,
and misery." Underlying the prevalence of conflict in Africa is a crisis of
governance and poverty leading to a scramble for resources. 12  Good
governance would make a major contribution to the reduction of conflict and
poverty. It would do this by creating an environment conducive to sustainable
5. Id. 4.
6. See id.; see also DEMOCRACY AND DEEP-ROOTED CONFLICT: OPTIONS FOR NEGOTIATORS (Peter
Harris & Ben Reilly eds., 1998) [hereinafter Harris & Reilly].
7. See Causes of Conflict, supra note 4, 12 (noting that "[a] communal sense of advantage or
disadvantage is often closely linked to this phenomenon, which is heightened in many cases by reliance on
centralized and highly personalized forms of governance.").
8. See, e.g., Democratic Republic of Congo, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1999, 34-36
(1999).
9. For example, Zimbabwe's costly military intervention in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo (DRC)
is widely considered by the public, western diplomats and analysts as partly a reaction to its severe economic
conditions. See ZIMBABWE: A GROWING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS I (AFRONET, Inter-African
Network for Human Rights and Development 1 th ed. 1999). Other elements external to the states may also
be involved involved in such conflicts. The U.N. General Assembly has acknowledged the role that
diamonds, for example, play in fueling conflict. It has found that they are a crucial factor in prolonging brutal
wars in parts of Africa. In Angola and Sierra Leone diamonds funded rebel groups. See General Assembly
Resolution 55/56, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 para. 1 (2001).
10. See generally Symposium, Refugees and Displaced Persons in Africa: From Emergency Relief to
Food Security and Development, INST. AFR. DEV. CORNELL UNIV. (Oct. 16-17, 1991).
11. In fact, as Douglas Anglin has observed, Africa has arguably slipped into one of the most violent
phases of its post-independence history "with political struggles spilling across borders as states interfere
militarily in their neighbor's affairs in ways once uncommon." He cites the conflicts in Congo, Rwanda,
Burundi, and Lesotho, where neighboring states have intervened in internal conflicts. See Anglin, supra note
2.
12. See WORLD BANK, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 60 (1989)
[hereinafter FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH].
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development, thereby reducing poverty-the root cause of many African
conflicts. Development seeks to expand choices for all people-women, men,
and children of both current and future generations. Development would
promote the economic, social, civil, and political realization of human rights
through the elimination of poverty and the promotion of human dignity and
rights, and by providing equitable opportunities for all through good
governance.
Human rights and sustainable development are interdependent and
mutually reinforcing. In conditions of prosperity, conflicts are less likely to
arise and more likely to be resolved quickly and peacefully if they do arise. As
the Secretary General of the United Nations has observed:
[i]n a country where those who hold power are not
accountable, but can use their power to monopolize wealth,
exploit their fellow citizens and repress peaceful dissent,
conflict is all too predictable and investment will be scarce.
But in a country where human rights and property rights are
protected, where government is accountable, and where those
affected by decisions play a part in the decision-making
process, there is real hope that poverty can be reduced, conflict
avoided, and capital mobilized both at home and from
abroad. 13
The answer to Africa's conflict and development quagmire lies in
establishing democratic governance in African countries. This calls for a
critical examination of the question of governance in Africa, with a view
toward identifying the obstacles to its development and toward possible
approaches to developing systems of governance that give political space to all
groups, thereby avoiding conflict and political instability. The most important
legal instrument in the scheme of good governance is the national constitution.
Thus, a major part of the answer to Africa's present predicament lies in the
development of constitutions by African countries that will stand the test of
time, and that will deliberately structure national institutions in such a way as to
ensure that a capable state is created. In the past two decades, Africa has been
the scene of constitutional changes unmatched on the continent since the end of
13. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Address at University of Yaounde, Cameroon (May 2, 2000).
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European colonialism in the 1960s.14 In 1989, only five African countries
could be described as democracies, but today well over three-quarters of the
countries in Africa have adopted democratic systems of governance. However,
in many of these countries the advances in democracy, though real, remain
fragile and in need of strengthening. Reversals in such countries as Zimbabwe
remind us that we should not become complacent and assume that democracy
has taken hold on the African continent. 5 Further, the tragedies in Rwanda,
Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Congo graphically illustrate the
horrendous consequences of failed constitutional arrangements. The future of
democracy in Africa is predicated on the development of viable constitutional
arrangements that set up practical institutions within which to conduct the
business of governance and which foster an environment where peace and
development can flourish. Such arrangements will ensure that the exercise of
governmental authority is conducted in a predictable, responsible, and legally
regulated way, to the satisfaction of civil society and society at large.
6
This article considers, in the context of globalization, the challenges facing
Africa in the democratization process. It first considers security and causes of
conflicts in Africa, the economic condition of Africa, and the relationship
between governance, conflict, and development. It then seeks to identify some
of the key issues that must be addressed in the process of developing durable
African constitutions, and the conditions under which constitutions should be
developed if they are to be acceptable to the people of the country they are
intended to govern. The article argues that good governance can endure only in
conditions of relative economic prosperity and development. In conditions of
extreme poverty, democracy cannot prosper. To the extent that the process of
structural adjustment has increased poverty in Africa, it has undermined the
process of democratization and made it much more difficult.
14. Filip Reyntjens observes that "virtually no country has been untouched by the wave of political
reform." Filip Reyntjens, The Winds of Change: Political and Constitutional Evolution in Francophone
Africa, 1990-1991, 35 J. AFR. L. 44 (1991); see also Peter Slinn, A Fresh Startfor Africa? New African
Constitutional Perspectives for the 1990s, 35 J. AFR. L. 1 (1991); Adrien Katherine Wing, Towards
Democracy in a New South Africa: Reviewing Ziyad Motala, Constitutional OptionsforA Democratic South
Africa: A Comparative Perspective, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 689 (1995).
15. The recent March 2002 election in Zimbabwe was widely condemned as undemocratic. The
government harassed the opposition and prevented campaigning. See Mugabe 's Madness, MAIL AND
GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER, Mar. 22-27, 2002, at 7 (citing a psychometric study that concluded Robert Mugabe
will become "increasingly suspicious, thin-skinned, vengeful, self-righteous and impervious to correction").
16. R.P. Meyer, Remarks at the Second Session of the Constitutional Assembly (Jan. 24, 1995), in
REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. DEBATES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY 12-14 (1995).
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I. SECURITY, CONFLICTS AND GOVERNANCE
The sources of African conflicts comprise a complex, interlocking web of
factors that are steeped in both history and contemporary realities, including
economic, social, and political conditions. At the 1885 Berlin Conference, the
colonial powers partitioned Africa into territorial units by arbitrarily dividing
kingdoms, states, and communities. 17 Unrelated areas and peoples were joined
together, and united peoples were torn apart.' 8 In the 1960s, the newly
independent African states inherited the colonial boundaries, a legacy that
challenged their territorial integrity and their attempts to achieve national
unity.19 The territorial challenge was enhanced in some new states by the
colonial laws and institutions that were designed to exploit local divisions.2 °
However, the era of serious conflict over state boundaries has largely passed,
aided by the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) 1963 decision to accept
the colonial boundaries inherited at independence. 21 Nevertheless, the
challenge of creating a genuine national identity among different ethnic groups
remains in most African countries. In general, threats to the territorial integrity
of African states arise from three principal sources: challenges to national
boundaries; minority demands of self-determination and secession; and cross-
border disputes.2 The preferred resolution has been mediation or adjudication,
although there are several cases in which countries have chosen to occupy a
contested area by force and later argue the merits of the case.23 Secession is
almost universally condemned by African states;24 it not only contravenes the
OAU charter, but is a threat that most African states fear.25
Colonialism, and its concomitant changes in the nature of commercial
relations, also created long-term distortions in Africa's political economy.
17. See RICHARD HALL, ZAMBIA 52 (1965).
18. Id.
19. Zambia, Zimbabwe, and almost all African countries inhabit colonial boundaries. Id.
20. Lord Frederick Lugard perfected the theory of indirect rule, a policy which used African institutions to
the advantage of the British. See LORD FREDERICK LUGARD, THE DUAL MANDATE IN BRITISH TROPICAL
AFRICA (5th ed. 1965). See also HALL, supra note 17, at 104.
2 1. Resolution on the Intangibility ofFrontiers, in ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENT,
First Ordinary Session, AGH/RES.16(l) (1964) (declaring "that all Member States pledge themselves to
respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence").
22. An example of this is the 1999-2001 Ethiopia-Eritrea border war. See Ethiopia Declares Horn of
Africa War Over, CNN.COM, May 31,2000, http://www.cnn.com/2000fWORLD/africa/05/3 1/hom.africa.02/.
23. Harris & Reilly, supra note 6, at 31.
24. Organization of African Unity Charter, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39, art. 3, reprinted in 2 I.L.M.
766 (1963).
25. See id., pmbl.
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Transportation networks, especially railroads and related infrastructure, were
specifically designed to satisfy the colonial country's trade needs and not
intended to support economic growth within the indigenous economy.
26
Colonial powers imposed unfavorable terms of trade and strongly skewed
economic activities toward extractive industries and exportation of primary
products. These conditions stimulated little demand to improve skills and
educational levels of the work force,27 a situation that continued into the post-
independence states. 28 The political competition in many African states is
aimed not at creating viable national economic systems, but rather at
encouraging the capture of key economic sectors for factional advantage. 9
The methods of capturing and maintaining political power in Africa are a
key source of conflict across the continent. Frequently, the candidate of a
political victory assumes a "winner-take-all" mentality with respect to
patronage, wealth, and resources, as well as the prestige and prerogative of
office. 30 A feeling of communal sense of advantage or disadvantage is often
closely linked to this phenomenon, which is heightened in many cases by
reliance on centralized and highly personalized forms of governance. 3' The
stakes for political control become dangerously high in jurisdictions with
insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of regime transparency, inadequate
checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful
means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights.
32
Whoever captures power can dispense the spoils of office to his or her
followers. The situation of political control is exacerbated when, as is often the
case in Africa, the economic pie to be shared is small and the state is the major
source of wealth accumulation. 33 Given the multi-ethnic character of most
African states, political conflict leads to a violent politicization of ethnicity.
34
26. Causes of Conflict, supra note 4, 9.
27. See id.
28. WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 3
(1981) [hereinafter AGENDA FOR ACTION].
29. See Causes of Conflict, supra note 4, 9.
30. Id.
31. Khabele Matlosa, Political Turbulence Ahead of the 2002 General Election, 14 S. AFRICA POL. &
ECON. MONTHLY 19 (2001).
32. Id.
33. In the case of Lesotho it has been observed that "the main problem confronting the resource poor and
economically underdeveloped Lesotho is that the state is perceived as the main pillar of accumulation. The
political elite constantly engage in fierce struggles over control and retention of state power in zero-sum
conflicts which often turn violent." Id.
34. See id.
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In extreme cases, rival communities believe that they can ensure their survival
only through control of state power; thus, conflict becomes virtually inevitable.
Given the limited existence of a middle class due to lack of industrialization,
there is usually no countervailing force to blunt the excesses of warlords, or the
state itself, 35 and conflict is intensified.36
During the cold war, external interference in the internal affairs of African
governments was a familiar feature of superpower rivalry.3 7 Today, external
interests continue to play a large and sometimes decisive role both in
suppressing and in sustaining conflict 38 in the competition for oil, diamonds,
timber, and other natural resources in Africa. The General Assembly has, for
instance, expressed concern over diamond-fuelled conflicts in a number of
African countries.39 Intervention is not limited, however, to governments
outside of Africa. Neighboring states, in the case of the Congo, have
intervened for military and economic reasons.40 The conflict in the Congo has
involved six African countries: Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda,
and Burundi.4 ' Much of the conflict in the Congo is fueled by the economic
interests of Uganda and Rwanda. These countries are engaged in the
exploitation of Congo's precious mineral resources. A U.N. Panel of Experts,
reporting on the exploitation of natural resources in the Congo, concluded that:
[t]he Panel has credible information indicating that various
actors, some based in South Africa and others outside, are
using the territories and facilities of South Africa to conduct
illicit commercial activities involving the natural resources of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For example, the
Panel has evidence that coltan, diamonds, and gold from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo are being smuggled into
35. YOWERI MUSEVENI, WHAT IS AFRICA'S PROBLEM? 192 (1992).
36. Matlosa, supra note 31, at 20.
37. See Causes of Conflict, supra note 4, 13; MUSEVENI, supra note 35, at 244.
38. See ZIMBABWE: A GROWING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS, supra note 9, at 1.
39. U.N. GAOR, G.A. Res. 175, 55th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56 (2001).
40. See id.
41. Mission Visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo, May 4-8, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/2000/416 (2000); see also, Christopher S. Wren, Congo's New Leader, at the UN., Pledges Talks With
War Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2001, at A7.
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South Africa, either through its porous northern border or
through its 4,000 unmonitored airstrips.42
In Liberia, the control and exploitation of diamonds, timber, and other raw
materials financed, and was one of the principal objectives of, the various
warring factions.43 It has been argued that many of the conflicts in Guinea have
little to do with the country's politics, and more to do with President Taylor of
Liberia's quest for economic control of the timber and diamonds in Guinea.
4 4
The same can be said of Angola, where many of the peace-process difficulties
are owed to the struggle to control the exploitation of the country's lucrative
diamond fields.45 In Sierra Leone, those who seized power from the elected
government in May 1997 were highly motivated by the chance to plunder
national resources.4 6
Despite the destruction from armed conflicts, many profit from war, as well
as from the resulting chaos and lack of accountability. International arms
merchants, for example, profit greatly from African conflicts.47 Indeed, a key
component to the surge of violence in Africa has been the ready availability of
cheap arms, mainly imported from Eastern Europe.48 Coupled with the
availability of arms is the huge population of unemployed and mercenaries
which can be contracted to wage interminable war.49
In addition to the sources of conflict identified above, a number of other
factors are especially important in particular sub-regions. "In Central Africa,
they include the competition for scarce land and water resources in densely
42. Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at 22, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/1072 (2001).
43. Causes ofConflict, supra note 4, 14; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2000 50
(1999) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS).
44. Lansana Gberie, Destabilizing Guinea: Diamonds, Charles Taylor and the Potential for Wider
Humanitarian Catastrophe, The Diamond and Human Security Project Occasional Paper 1,4 (2001).
45. Causes ofConflict, supra note 4, 14; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANGOLA UNRAVELS: THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE LUSAKA PEACE PROCESS 137 (1999).
46. Causes of Conflict, supra note 4, 14; see also HUMAN RIGHTS supra note 43, at 67 (describing
conditions in Sierra Leone as a result).
47. Causes ofConflict, supra note 4, 14.
48. U.N. Reports expose a vast and complex international network of illegal diamond and arms trafficking
involving the Angolan, Sierra Leone, and Congo wars. See, e.g., Carola Hoyos, UNExposes Angola Diamond
Trade, BBC NEWS, Dec. 22, 2000, at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/diamond/2000/
1222ang.htm; Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 55th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/1199 (2000).
49. See generally Jakkie Cilliers & Richard Comwell, Mercenaries and the Privatisation ofSecurity in
Africa, 8 AFR. SECURITY REV. (1999), http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/8No2/Cilliers.html.
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populated areas., 50 In Rwanda, for example, several families often claim rights
to the same piece of land, causing multiple waves of displacement.5" In oil-
producing areas, conflict often arises from local complaints that the
communities where the resources are located do not adequately reap the
benefits of oil exploitation, or do not receive adequate compensation for the
resulting environmental degradation and pollution. 52 In some North Africa
states, conflicts result from tensions between different factions holding strongly
opposing visions of the nature of society and the state. For instance, in the
Sudan, a clash of vision between the Arab Islamic north and the culturally and
religiously more diverse black south threatens the state's territorial integrity. 3
Thus, the Wars of Africa are not inevitable; they are caused by leaders who
yield to the narrowest definition of self-interest and sacrifice the country's
citizens to their own greed, ambition, and weakness, and they are sustained by
the social and economic conditions in African countries.
II. GOVERNANCE, CONFLICTS AND POVERTY
A 1993 study of 233 internal conflicts around the world, concluded that
democracies had a far better record of peacefully managing such conflicts than
alternative systems.54 The empirical fact that democracies are far less likely to
go to war with each other than other regimes further substantiates the
relationship between poverty and conflict, and their impact on the
democratization process.55 Authoritarian or totalitarian systems simply do not
have the institutions by which conflicts in society can be peacefully expressed
and resolved. Dictatorships generally try to deal with conflicts by ignoring or
denying them, or by suppressing them using state coercive apparatus. While
such methods may indeed control conflicts (albeit usually at a severe cost), they
50. Causes of Conflict, supra note 4, 15.
51. Id.
52. Id. See also generally BRONWEN MANBY, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES (1999).
53. See Abdullahi A. An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng, Self-Determination and Unity: The Case of Sudan,
18 LAW & POL'Y 199, 215-18 (1996).
54. Harris & Reilly, supra note 6, at 22-23.
55. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 2 DAC ORIENTATIONS ON
PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 12-13 (1994) [hereinafter ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT]; U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, THE SHRINKING STATE:
GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF
INDEPENDENT STATES (1997).
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generally cannot resolve them. 6 The implication of fundamental issues such as
identity and cultural integrity in such conflicts means that almost nothing short
of mass expulsions or genocide will make the conflicts disappear. It is
generally believed that the ethnic conflict that erupted in the former Yugoslavia
in 1990, for example, had been suppressed for almost fifty years during the
years of communism, but was always present and unresolved.5 7  An
authoritarian system can present an illusion of short-term stability through its
use of coercive state power to suppress dissent, but is unlikely to sustain that
stability over the long term.
In contrast, it is argued that under a democracy, disputes that arise are likely
to be processed, debated, and reacted to, rather than resolved definitively and
permanently. 58 In short, democracy operates as a conflict management system.
As Harris and Reilly have observed, it is this ability to handle conflicts without
having to suppress them or be engulfed by them that distinguishes democratic
governance from authoritarian rule. 59 This does not by any means suggest that
democracy is perfect, or that the mere establishment of democratic governance
will itself lead to the settlement or prevention of conflicts. There are a number
of cases in which democratic institutions are hastily "transplanted" to post-
conflict societies without taking root or with a subsequent resumption of
hostilities-as in the cases of Burundi, Cambodia and Liberia.60 But it is
equally true that these cases offer many lessons as to how deals are struck and
which choices are of crucial importance to building a sustainable outcome.6 1
Democracy is often messy and difficult, but it is also the best hope for building
sustainable solutions to most conflicts in the world. However, democratic
institutions have to be strong enough to function effectively and fairly. They
can only be strong where the economic conditions are such that they can be
sustained.
The United Nations has observed that conflicts are most prevalent in poor
countries 62 (especially those with significant economic inequalities). 63 The
56. See Harris & Reilly, supra note 6, at 33 (discussing management of conflict through "the right
combination of procedures and institutions").
57. See generally LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION (1996).
58. Harris & Reilly, supra note 6, at 139 (emphasizing the prevalence of consensus in democracies).
59. See id. at 136.
60. Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New
or Restored Democracies, U.N. Doc. A/51/512 (1996) [hereinafter Support by the U.N. System].
61. One learns from the mistakes made in earlier efforts. See id.
62. See generally Causes of Conflict, supra note 4.
63. d. 3.
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existence of sustainable livelihoods, and the absence of poverty, are closely
linked to human rights and the exercise of democratic rights.64 Poverty and
inequality can undermine human rights by fueling social unrest and violence,
and by increasing the precariousness of social, economic, and political rights.65
The situation in many countries is often made worse by the existence of sharp
ethnic or religious cleavages.66 Almost invariably, where the rights of
subordinate groups are insufficiently respected, the institutions of government
are insufficiently inclusive, and the allocation of society's resources favors and
benefits the dominant faction. 67  The solution is clear, even if difficult to
achieve in practice: it is to promote human rights; to protect minority rights; to
build strong political and governmental institutions; and to institute democratic
governance in which all groups are represented. "[lt is essential, if man is not
to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny
and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law., 68
One cannot successfully lead an insurgency against a government that is
democratic, strong and effective and meets the basic social and economic needs
of its people.69 It stands to reason that recruitment to the cause of the
insurgency will be nearly impossible when people are happy and believe that
warfare is not the only way to draw attention to their grievance or to create
change.70 Successful recruitment for insurgencies thrives on unemployment,
especially among youth.
Conflicts and poor governance have exacted a horrendous toll on Africa's
economic condition. Africa has the dubious distinction of being both the least
developed and, in terms of natural resources, the most endowed continent in the
world.7 ' With a land area three times the size of the United States and a
population of some 600 million people, Africa enjoys the resources required to
attain sustainable development, characterized by increasingly productive
64. Id. 3.
65. See id. 4.
66. Id. 12.
67. See Harris & Reilly, supra note 6, at 33.
68. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 pmbl. (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
69. See Harris & Reilly, supra note 6, at 33 (discussing the "economic factors" of deep-rooted conflict).
70. Id. (where "new patterns of interaction" are introduced, the parties become "most amenable to the
consideration of novel alternatives and different solutions").
71. See generally AGENDA FOR ACTION, supra note 28; The Lagos Plan ofAction for the Implementation
of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic Development ofAfrica, 2nd Extra Ordinary Assembly of the OAU
Heads of State and Government Devoted to Economic Matters 76 (1980), at http://www.uneca.orgadfiii/
riefforts/ref/other2.htm.
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employment opportunities and a steadily improving quality of life for all of its
citizens.72 The continent has vast mineral, oil, water, land, and human
resources. 73 Nonetheless, about 240 million Africans live on less than one
dollar a day, have no access to safe drinking water, and are illiterate.74 The
ambiguity in Africa's position is revealed with particular clarity in relation to its
production of food: although during pre-colonial times the continent was self-
sufficient in this sector, it is now increasingly dependent upon external
supplies, and many countries in Africa rely on food aid for the survival of their
populations. 7s On the face of it, the African continent's apparent inability to
feed itself is paradoxical since one of the region's chief assets is its agricultural
potential. It has huge tracts of arable land and water resources. Africa
possesses all of the necessary elements for becoming one of the world's major
food baskets.76
Unfortunately, Africa lacks the capital necessary to translate its enormous
wealth into realizable benefits for its people, and it has failed to attract foreign
investments sufficient to fill the gap. Africa receives only five percent of all
direct foreign investment flowing to developing countries.7 7 This is in spite of
the fact that investments made in Africa consistently generate high rates of
return. For example, during the period from 1990 to 1994, the average annual
return on book value of U.S. direct investment in Africa was nearly twenty-
eight percent, compared with eight and a half percent for U.S. direct investment
worldwide. 78 At the root of the problem is the world-wide perception of Africa
as an unstable, poorly governed, and conflict-ridden continent that cannot
72. See generally FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, supra note 12; Julius Nyerere, Africa Exists in
the Economic South, 41 DEV. & SOC. ECON. PROGRESS, 3, 7-8 (1988); U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR
AFRICA, AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS FOR SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND TRANSFORMATION, U.N. Doc. E/ECA/CM. 1 5/6/Rev.3 (1989), available at
http://www.africaaction.org/african-initiatives/aafl .htm.
73. Nyerere, supra note 72, at 45.
74. For a discussion of Africa's economic situation, see generally Adebayo Adedeji & Tariq Husain, The
Leadership Challenge for Improving the Economic and Social Situation of Africa (1988); PROSPECTS FOR
RECOVERY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (Aguibou Y. Yansand ed., 1996) [hereinafter
PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY); FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, supra note 12.
75. ALFRED JOHN WILLS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL AFRICA 1 (4th ed. 1984).
76. Karl Lavrencic, Food for Africa, NEW AFR., Feb. 1979, at 90, 137.
77. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AFRICA 3, U.N.
DOC. UNCTAD/DTCI/19 (1995).
78. SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)-USA: TRADE AND INVESTMENT, UNITED
STATES DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AFRICA (1998).
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guarantee the safety of foreign investments. 79 In its 1989 report on Sub-
Saharan Africa, the World Bank concluded:
Underlying the litany of Africa's development problems is a
crisis of governance .... By governance is meant the exercise
of political power to manage a nation's affairs. Because
countervailing power has been lacking, state officials in many
countries have served their own interests without fear of being
called to account . . . .The leadership assumes broad
discretionary authority and loses its legitimacy. Information is
controlled, and voluntary associations are co-opted or
disbanded. This environment cannot readily support a
dynamic economy.8°
Reports by the United Nations and multilateral lending institutions
unanimously attribute Africa's inability to realize its potential to its lack of
good govemance.8 A growing international consensus recognizes the central
role that a good, efficient, and capable government plays in the economic and
social development of a country.82 The General Assembly has recognized that
democratic, transparent, and accountable governance in all sectors of society
forms an indispensable foundation for the realization of social and people-
centered sustainable development.8 3 The General Assembly has called on
member states to respect and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms, especially the right to development, while maintaining focus on the
"interdependent and mutually reinforcing relationship between democracy,
79. See Hopeless Africa, supra note 1; see also TED ROBERT GURR & BARBARA HARFF, ETHNIC
CONFLICT IN WORLD POLITICS 13 (1994). However, Africa also suffers from the image that the continent is
poor even in areas such as corruption where the actual situation is better than that prevailing in other regions.
For instance, the perception is that Africa has the most corrupt regimes in the world; however, the Flemings
Research Institute found the levels of corruption, in Africa to be below the levels in the former Soviet Union
and Central America. See FLEMINGS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FLEMINGS AFRICA INDEX (1998).
80. See FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, supra note 12, at 60-61. See generally WORLD BANK,
GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT]; INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND, GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE IMF's ROLE (1997) [hereinafter GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE
IMF'S ROLE]; WORLD BANK, CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21 ST CENTURY?, 48-53 (2000) [hereinafter CAN
AFRICA CLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY?].
81. See U.N. SYSTEM-WIDE SPECIAL INITIATIVE ON AFRICA [hereinafter UNISA], DELIBERATIONS OF
AFRICAN GOVERNANCE FORUM, July I 1-13, 1997; see also WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1997)
[hereinafter DEVELOPMENT REPORT].
82. See UNISA, supra note 81; see also DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 81.
83. Support by the U.N. System, supra note 60, 60.
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development, and respect for human rights. 84 Indeed, the African states
themselves have come to realize the importance of governance in the
development process. The New Partnership for Africa Development, while
recognizing the historical and colonial roots of African underdevelopment,
argues that Africa's future is in its own hands. It candidly recognizes that past
attempts to set out continent-wide development programs have not succeeded in
part because of questionable leadership and ownership by Africans themselves.
The Partnership welcomes the fact that "[a]cross the continent, democracy is
spreading backed by the African Union.- 85
The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) has defined good governance as
"the responsible exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in
the management of a country's affairs at all levels." 86 Good governance is,
among other things, participatory, transparent, accountable, effective, equitable,
and fair.87 Good governance promotes the rule of law. 88 Participation involves
members of the public in the decisionmaking as to, and implementation of,
public projects or other government activity. It goes beyond the arena of
consultation. It implies the existence of opportunities to contribute through
gainful employment; opportunities to move in the mainstream of political,
economic, and cultural processes without suffering marginalization and
discrimination; freedom from poverty and deprivation; and freedom from
vulnerability through a guaranteed system of social safety nets and social
security systems.
Transparency involves establishing appropriate lines or forms of
accountability between the government and the public, which can include
access to information, open decisionmaking, and rules of procedural fairness.
Fairness is broken down into substantive and procedural elements, with
substantive fairness requiring the actual fairness of results and procedural
fairness requiring that the process of representation, decisionmaking, and
84. U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., 112th plen. rntg., U.N. Doc A/Res/50/25 (1996).
85. NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD), ANEW AFRICAN INITIATIVE 45 (2001),
at http://www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news-upload/NEPAD-2dARCHIVES-2edb.AAOO20105.pdf.
86. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1997),
at http://magnet.undp.org/policy/default.htm; see also U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, AIDE MEMOIRE:
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND EQUITY (July 28-30,
1997), at http://magnet.undp.org/icg97/GovConference/annexes 17.pdf
87. Apolo R. Nsibarnbi, The Interface Among the Capable State, the Private Sector and Civil Society in
Acquiring Food Security in Africa, Keynote Presentation at Conference on Building for the Capable State in
Africa, Inst. for Afr. Dev., Cornell University (Oct. 24-28, 1977).
88. Id.
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enforcement in an institution be clearly specified, non-discriminatory, and
internally consistent. Good governance ensures that political, social, and
economic priorities reflect broad consensus in society and that decisionmakers
represent the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable in allocating
development resources. In short, good governance creates what may be
described as a capable state. In this context, a capable state is transparent;
accountable in the conduct of national affairs; able to enforce law and order
throughout the country; respectful of human rights; effective in providing
infrastructure; limited in its involvement in the market economy; responsible
for the creation of a favorable policy environment; and successful a partner with
the private sector and civil society.89 Other important characteristics of a
capable state include acceptance of opposition and competitive politics;
predictable, open, and enlightened policymaking; a bureaucracy imbued with a
professional ethos acting in furtherance of the public good; maintenance of fair
terms of trade between the rural and urban sectors; and recognition and respect
of the boundaries between itself, the private sector, and civil society. 9°
III. THE COLONIAL LEGACY IN AFRICA
Africa's problems are, to a very large extent, rooted in its inability to
overcome the legacy of the past. The continent has suffered a painful history
that includes some of the worst human tragedies in living memory: slavery,
colonialism, and apartheid. As a direct result of these tragedies, when African
countries won independence, they faced formidable constraints to governance
and development. These constraints included underdeveloped human
resources, political fragility, and insecurity rooted in ill-suited institutions. This
legacy will continue to hamper African development for decades to come. But
Africa should draw lessons, strength, and determination rather than despair
from the past. The serious problems facing Africa should prompt a
fundamental reexamination and redirection, rather than a feeling of
hopelessness and a mindset of blaming everything on the colonial past.
Traditional African society had its own system of social and political
organization. 91 For instance, the Lozi of Zambia had a complex economy that
89. Patricia Armstrong, Human Rights and Multilateral Development Banks: Governance Concerns in
Decision Making, 88 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.PROC. 277, 280-81 (1994).
90. Nsibambi, supra note 87.
91. See generally ELIZABETH COLSON, SEVEN TRIBES OF CENTRAL AFRICA (1968); ELIZABETH COLSON,
SEVEN TRIBES OF BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA (1959); ELIZABETH COLSON, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY
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92required many people to cooperate in various productive activities. The
village constituted the basic unit of organization in the structure of their
economic, political, and domestic system.93 The Lozi exploited gardens and
parcels of land throughout the village. 94 A headman was the political and
administrative head of the village, took responsibility for it to the King in
Council, and represented the village at the chief-headed Council.9 5 The Chief
governed with the assistance of councilors.9 6 Since the advent of colonialism,
however, African societies have experienced fundamental and protracted
economic and social changes. 97 The era of colonialism initiated-and the era of
independence consummated-a dynamic process of disruption in tribal
organization and tribal life. After those changes, unlike in pre-colonial times,
the financial, political, and military security of African societies no longer
depended on traditional organizations and custom but rather on new political
and economic institutions.
Many African societies have departed from agrarian self-subsistence
communities to a money economy dependent on the capitalist economic system.
With such fundamental changes, the political institutions governing African
societies also had to transform. The foremost act of disruption was the
unification of ethnic communities, under the umbrella of sovereign states,
created pursuant to the Berlin Conference of 1884; these communities were
granted with overriding political control within their whole area of
AMONG THE PLATEAU TONGA OF NORTHERN RHODESIA (1958); MAX GLUCKMAN, POLITICS, LAW AND
RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY (1965); Isaak I. Dore, Constitutionalism and the Post-Colonial State in Africa: A
Rawlsian Approach, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1301, 1302 (1997).
92. MAx GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN RHODESIA 7 (2d ed.
1967).
93. Id at 6.
94. Id at 7.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 9; see also MUTUMBA MAINGA, BULOZI UNDER THE LUYANA KINGS 43 (1973).
97.
In 1890, for example, Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, remarked at a dinner
at Mansion House following the conclusion of the Anglo-French Convention which
established spheres of influence in West Africa, that "[wle have been engaged in
drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod; we have been giving
away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small
impediment that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes
were."
Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113,
1135 (1994) (quoting J.C. ANENE, THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES OF NIGERIA 1865-1960, at 3 (1970)).
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jurisdiction.98 Dislocation of African peoples from their lands and communities
continued throughout the colonial period as the needs of the colonial economy
expanded, further undermining any tribal economy or social organization that
might have been left in place after the initial establishment of colonial rule.99
Independence did not change the fundamental structure of the colonial society,
and therefore did not stop the decline of traditional institutions. In almost all
cases, the African independence leadership took over the colonial state as
established by the departing colonial power.
Colonial rule was philosophically and organizationally elitist, centralist,
and absolute. Lacking representative institutions, the colonial administration
not only implemented policy, but made it as well. Seidman has observed that
authoritarian forms of government everywhere express their character by giving
relatively unbound discretion to the man or woman on the spot. I°° Colonial
officials were given almost unlimited discretion with no formal controls over
their exercise of power.' 0 ' As colonial rulers sought expedient interlocutors,
they distorted or destroyed pre-colonial governance systems by creating or
encouraging arrangements, such as indirect rule, that manipulated traditional
forms of governance. 0 2 Such arrangements made existing local chiefs more
despotic and created new ones (warrant chiefs) where none existed before. 10 3
During the colonial period, African societies became divided into the rural and
the urban, with two distinct cultures. Traditional culture resided in the rural
areas, where the great majority of the people lived and which operated largely
outside the framework of colonial elitism, 0 4 whereas the urban areas housed
98. See R. ROTBERG, THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL AFRICA: THE MAKING OF MALAWI AND
ZAMBIA, 1873-1964, at 303 (1965); Abdulqawi A.Yusuf, Reflections on the Fragility of State Institutions in
Africa, 2 AFR. Y.B. INT'L. L. 4 (1995); J.B. OJWANG, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 24-26
(1990).
99. Okoth Ogendo, Property Systems and Social Organization in Africa: An Essay on the Relative
Position of Women Under Indigenous and Received Law, in THE INDIVIDUAL UNDER AFRICAN LAW:
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ALL-AFRICA LAW CONFERENCE 47 (Peter Nanyenya Takirambudde ed., 1982);
see also Kwamena Bentsi-Enchil, Do African Systems of Land Tenure Require a Special Terminology?, 9 J.
AFR. L. 114, 133-39 (1965) (discussing the colonial heritage in land issues).
100. Robert B. Seidman, Draftingfor the Rule ofLaw: Maintaining Legality in Developing Countries, 12
YALE J. INT'L L. 84, 105 (1987).
101. See Ogendo, supra note 99.
102. J. Gus LIEBENOW, COLONIAL RULE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA: THE CASE OF THE
MAKONDE 84 (1971).
103. See generally L.F.G. ANTHONY, NORTH OF THE ZAMBEZI: THE STORY OF NORTHERN RHODESIA
(1953); L.H. GANN, THE BIRTH OF A PLURAL SOCIETY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORTHERN RHODESIA
UNDER THE BRITISH SOUTH AFRICA COMPANY, 1894-1914 (1958); L.H. GANN, A HISTORY OF NORTHERN
RHODESIA (1964).
104. J.B. Ojwang, Rural Dispute Settlement in Kenya, 7-10 ZAMBIA L.J. 63 (1975-78).
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the "modem culture." The urban economy and culture served as the link
between the metropolitan country and the colony in the export of raw
materials.'0 5 Colonial economic policies kept African economies small,
excessively open, dependent, and poorly integrated. 0 6 The colonial state was
characterized by a huge gap in the standards of living between the rural and
urban areas.
This rural/urban divide, dating from the colonial period, continues today
and indeed has widened. 10 7  The rural areas continue to be neglected,
marginalized, and impoverished, as states are extremely weak and fail to
provide services to rural areas. Furthermore, increasing evidence indicates that
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank stabilization and
structural adjustment programs, which are in place in almost all African
countries, have worsened the situation. 0 8 For instance, the withdrawal of state
marketing agencies absent an adequate competitive private sector to replace it
has exposed poor farmers to exploitation by large city traders.'t 9 In the case of
Zambia, it has actually led to a decline in food production and a crisis in
agriculture."10 The crisis is further exacerbated by the lack of popular
participation in governance, and by the lack of effective devolution of power to
local communities.
In addition to enduring long after independence, the colonial legacy has had
a major influence in the style of governance prevalent in Africa."' Colonial
rule bequeathed to independent African states undemocratic governments and
bureaucracies that emphasized hierarchy, compliance, and discipline, without
addressing other equally important concerns such as public accountability,
responsiveness, and participation."l 2 Many governments that emerged after
105. Robert Seidman, Law and Stagnation in Zambia, in LAW IN ZAMBIA 273 (Muna Ndulo ed., 1984).
106. See, e.g., Cherry Gertzel et al., Introduction: The Making of the One-Party State, in THE DYNAMICS
OF THE ONE-PARTY STATE IN ZAMBIA 5 (Cherry Gertzel ed., 1984).
107. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, ZAMBIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999/2000 (2000)
[hereinafter ZAMBIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT].
108. Ann Seidman, Toward an Alternative Development Strategy, in PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY, supra
note 74, at 263.
109. See Samuel S. Bowles, Globalization and Economic Justice, Benjamin H. Hibbard Memorial Lecture
given at the University of Wisconsin - Madison (March 1,2000). See also THE WORLD BANK, CAN AFRICA
CLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY? 184 (2000).
110. See generally ZAMBIA HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 107.
111. Benjamin Obi Nwabueze, Our March to Constitutional Democracy, Guardian Lecture (July 24, 1989),
in L. & PRAC., J. NIG. B. A. 19-38 (1989). See generally Robert B. Seidman, Perspectives on Constitution-
Making: Independence Constitution for Namibia and South Africa, 3 LESOTHO L.J. 45 (1987).
112. In the analysis of factors that led to the introduction of the one-party system in Zambia, the authors note
that early analyses emphasized the continuing influences of the "colonial legacy of bureaucratic
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independence soon became undemocratic, over-centralized, and
authoritarian. " l3 Predictably, political monopolies led to corruption, nepotism,
abuse of power, and conflict. 14  African presidents replaced their colonial
governors in fact but also in deeds. "' Like the colonial governors, they became
the sole embodiment of the social will and purposes of the countries they ruled.
Repressive single- or no-party systems of government emerged.I16 With one-
party systems, power came to be concentrated in one person. "Dissent, for
which there had always been a secure and honoured place in traditional African
society, came to be viewed with ill-concealed hostility, almost as if it was
treason."'" 7  Multiple parties, even if originally formed around national
agendas, generally evolved into ethnically based parties that made African
states ungovernable."18  Single-party or military rule became regarded as a
viable, sometimes desirable, solution to the ethnically based parties in Africa's
new modem states." 9 Ultimately, the single party supplanted the machinery of
the state, blurring the differences between the two.
120
authoritarianism" in many parts of Africa. Gertzel, supra note 106, at 1; see also Dore, supra note 91, at
1303-04 (observing that the imperfections of post-colonial constitutions were in part a reflection of the fact
that those who prepared the colonies for independence were themselves not democratic and were ignorant or
insensitive to the prevailing social and cultural dynamics of the societies which they had colonized).
113. James C.N. Paul, Putting the Governance of African Internal Security Forces Under the Rule ofLaw,
in THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES 1996-97: THE GOVERNANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA viii, xv (James C.N. Paul ed., 1997).
114. Idatxiv.
115. Id.
116. See generally Gertzel, supra note 106; Yusuf, supra note 98; Lawrence Zimba, The Origins and
Spread of One-Party States in Commonwealth Africa, Their Impact on Personal Liberties. A Case Study of
the Zambian Model, in LAW IN ZAMBIA 113 (Muna Ndulo ed., 1984); Nkumbula v. Attorney-General,
ZAMBIA L. REP. 204-15 (Ct. App. 1972) (deciding that the presidential decree establishing a one-party
democracy in Zambia did not infringe appellant's rights).
117. Olusegun Obasanjo, Africa in Today's World, in IBRAHIM B. BABANGIDA & OLUSEGUN OBASANJO,
AFRICA IN TODAY'S WORLD AND THE CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP: PRESENTATION AT THE AFRICA
LEADERSHIP FORUM 17 (1988); see also John Kimwanga, Tortuous Road to Multi-Partyism, in IN SEARCH OF
FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN EAST AFRICA 55 (Kivutha Kibwana et al. eds.,
1996).
118. Museveni's main justification for his movement system in Uganda is that political parties form on the
basis ofethnicity. MUSEVENI, supra note 35, at 42 (observing that one of Africa's biggest weaknesses is how
"tribalism and other forms of sectarianism" are emphasized in African politics). The Secretary-General of the
United Nations has observed that this problem is "compounded by the fact that the framework of colonial laws
and institutions which some new States inherited had been designed to exploit local divisions, not overcome
them." Causes of Conflict, supra note 4, 8.
119. See Simbi V. Mubako, Zambia's Single-Party Constitution-A Search for Unity and Development, 5
ZAMBIA L.J. 67, 68-69 (1973); see also, e.g., REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ONE-PARTY PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN ZAMBIA 1, 21-22 (1972)
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION].
120. Gertzel, supra note 106; JOHN M. MWANAKATWE, END OF THE KAUNDA ERA 101 (1994).
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Thus, forty years or so into independence, governance in Africa was in
crisis, with a litter of failed and dysfunctional states whose characteristics
included: (1) highly centralized systems of governance; (2) excessive state
control coupled with limited capacity to govem; (3) arbitrary policymaking and
abuse of executive power; (4) erosion of the boundaries between the state and
civil society; (5) weak institutions of both state and civil society, with few
forces countervailing the executive branch of authority; (6) unaccountable
bureaucracies; (7) widespread corruption; (8) unenforced or unjust legal
systems; (9) widespread violation of human rights; (10) limited participation in
governance by the general citizenry; and (11) preferential access to power and
resources often determined by religious, ethnic, or geographical considerations.
The lack of democratic governance has resulted in unprecedented economic
decline and mismanagement, causing unimaginable poverty and conflict. In
fact, the dreams of post-independence prosperity and self-rule have become the
nightmare of insecurity and poverty. 12' Lack of democratic governance has
shut off the springs of activity in the people. As Obasanjo observed, "[t]he men
and women of spirit who are the leaven of every society either began to go into
exile in foreign countries or withdrew into stultifying private life; to their own
loss yes, but to the even greater loss of society at large.' ' 122 There are more
African medical doctors working in the Western countries than there are in
Africa, and UNESCO estimates that as many as 30,000 Africans holding PhD
degrees are living outside the continent.
23
IV. GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Good governance furthers the protection of human rights at both the
international and national levels. Democracy involves three central rights: the
right to take part in government, the right to vote and to be elected, and the
right to equal access to public service. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights states that the will of the people shall be the basis for the authority of
government. 124 A number of intemational instruments reflect the principal
121. Timothy M. Shaw & Paul Goulding, Alternative Scenarios for Africa, in ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR
AFRICA 98 (Timothy M. Shaw ed., 1982).
122. Obasanjo, supra note 117, at 17.
123. Thalif Deen, Africa's Brain Drain Accelerates, DAILY MAIL & GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER, Feb. 10,
1999, available at http://www.chico.mweb.co.za/mg/news/99feb /lOfeb-sciencebraindrain.html.
124. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 21(3) ("The will of the people shall be the
basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections...").
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concerns underlying governance, including the right of peoples freely to
determine their political status, 25 the right of all elements of society actively to
participate in defining and achieving developmental goals, 2 6 and the right of all
people to participate in the political life of their country. 27 Thus, international
instruments for the promotion and protection of human rights within the U.N.
system are replete with admonitions that popular political participation must be
free. 128
While such instruments do not describe a particular methodology for
ensuring such freedom, their essence is clear: to be free, participation in the
political processes of a country must be conducted in an atmosphere
characterized by the absence of intimidation and the presence of a wide range
of fundamental human rights.129 While the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights enunciates and elaborates upon each of the rights in the covenants, and
regional conventions too contribute to their protection, some of those rights take
on additional importance for political participation purposes. Worthy of
125. Id., art. 20 ("(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one
may be compelled to belong to an association."); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May
2, 1948, art. XXI (right to peaceful assembly), XXII (right to associate "to promote, exercise and protect...
legitimate interests of a political, economic, religious, social, cultural, professional, labor union or other
nature"), OEA/Ser.L. V/11/71, Doc. 6 rev. 1, 18 (1988) [hereinafter American Declaration of Rights and
Duties].
126. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 21 (1) ("Everyone has the right to
take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives."); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 25(a), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (echoing article 2 1(1) of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) [hereinafter International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights].
127. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 21(2) ("Everyone has the rightof
equal access to public service in his country."); International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, supra
note 126, art. 25 ("Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity... (b) To vote and to be elected at
genuine periodic elections ... guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have access.
.to public service in his country."); American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, art. 23, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (right to participate in government).
128. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 126, art. 25 (emphasizing
that "[e]very citizen shall have the right and the opportunity [for political participation] ...without
unreasonable restrictions") and art. 2 (ensuring the protection of rights "without distinction of any kind, such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status"); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 21 (emphasizing that political
participation is an individual freedom); cf. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Jan. 3, 1976, pmbl., 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (noting that "the equal and inalienable rights of all the members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world") [hereinafter International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights].
129. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 126, pmbl. ("[r]ecognizing that, in
accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and
political freedom... can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and
political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights.").
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individual mention in this regard are the rights to free opinion,'30 free
expression,' 31 information,'32 assembly and association,133 independent judicial
procedure, '34 and protection from discrimination.135 To this end, all obstacles
to full participation of individuals in the affairs of state must be removed, and
legislation that grants the fights of individuals must not contain any
reservations.
1 36
Increasingly, a norm is emerging pursuant to which only democracy
validates governance. As Thomas Franck has argued, a democratic entitlement,
while not yet fully worldwide law, is rapidly becoming a normative rule of the
international system. 137  Governments increasingly recognize that their
legitimacy depends on meeting a normative expectation of the international
community. This recognition has led to the emergence of a particular
expectation: that those who seek the validation of their empowerment must
patently govern with the consent of the governed. U.N. actions support the
emergence of this norm. On June 16, 1993, U.N. Security Council, for the first
time in the U.N. history, authorized member states to use force to restore
democracy in the independent state of Haiti.138
In recent years, the United Nations has become increasingly involved in
promoting democracy, primarily by providing various forms of electoral
130. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 2, 19; see also International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 128, art. 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 126, art. 19; cf. id., art. 18 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and art.
20 (prohibiting war propaganda and incitements to discrimination).
13 1. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 19; see also International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 126, art. 19.
132. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 126, art. 20.
133. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 68, arts.20(l), 23(4) (right to form and join
trade unions); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 126, arts. 21,22 (right
of freedom of association including trade unions).
134. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 68, arts. 6-11; see also International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 126, arts. 2(3), 14-16.
135. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 68, arts. 2, 23(2); see also International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 126, arts. 2, 26.
136. Cf. AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, rev. 5 art. 11
(1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) ("Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others.
The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law in particular those
enacted in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of others."),
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/zlafchar.htm; see also id. at art. 10 ("Every individual
shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law.").
137. Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
138. See The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/47/975, S/26063, at 2-3 (July 12, 1993). See generally Irwin Stotzky, SILENCING THE GuNS IN HAITI:
THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1997).
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assistance to member states. Prior to the Security Council Resolutions on Haiti,
the U.N. efforts to promote democracy were essentially limited to assisting
voluntary transitions to democratic governance with the consent of a member
state or the parties to a conflict.1 39 These efforts to promote democratic
governance through voluntary means arguably began at the inception of the
United Nations under Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the U.N. Charter.1
40
Pursuant to these provisions, the U.N. Trusteeship Council has organized over
thirty plebiscites since 1945, bringing self-rule and independence to former
colonies and other non-self-governing territories. 141 Since the 1980s, however,
the United Nations has become increasingly involved in the active promotion of
democratic governance among its membership. The most important and visible
forms of this activity have been the Security Council's sponsorship of elections
relating to international peace keeping and the General Assembly's
authorization of civilian election assistance requested by member states.'
42
There are two Charter-based rationales for the Assembly's authority to conduct
such activities in support of democracy. The first rests on the Assembly's
residual role in preserving international peace and security. i43 The second rests
on the General Assembly's broad mandate to promote peace, human
development, and human rights. 144 One can also point to the fact that a
growing number of international peace processes, many under the auspices of
the United Nations, have also addressed the construction or strengthening of
democratic institutions and the protection of human rights.
45
Good governance gives societies sound structures for economic and social
development. In post-conflict settings, good governance can promote
reconciliations and offer a path for consolidating peace. In addition, U.N.
programs now target virtually all the key elements of good governance, such as
safeguarding the rule of law; verifying elections; training police; monitoring
139. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, GUIDELINES ON SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTORAL
ASSISTANCE 1 (1992).
140. See id.
141. See UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ELECTIONS: A HANDBOOK ON THE LEGAL, TECHNICAL
AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS OF ELECTIONS 3 (1994).
142. See Mozambique: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/25518 (Apr. 2, 1993);
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, THE END OF APARTHEID: THE REPORT OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OBSERVER GROUP TO THE SOUTH AFRICA ELECTIONS 26-29 APRIL 1994 (1994).
143. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 11, 14.
144. See id., art. 62.
145. See G.A. Res. 1260, U.N. SCOR, 4035th mtg., U.N. Doc. S./RES/1260 (1999) (calling upon the
Government of Sierra Leone to ensure compliance with its obligations under the Peace Agreement to promote
peace and national reconciliation, and to foster respect for human rights).
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human rights; fostering investments; and promoting accountable
administration.146 The U.N. Development Program has connected the practice
of good governance with the improvement of human development.'14 7
Similarly, the World Bank has promoted good governance practices,
including reform of the public sector and promotion of the rule of law. 148 The
IMF has implemented a policy of promoting those components of good
governance that relate to economic performance. 149 Other international and
supranational organizations, such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD),' 50 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE),' 51 the British Commonwealth, 152 and the European Union
(EU),153 have all developed good governance standards for their development
assistance activities. 154  In addition, many individual donor states have
developed assistance policies that include good governance. Democracy is thus
well on the way to becoming a global entitlement, one that will be increasingly
promoted and protected by collective international processes. We are
witnessing a change in international law, and as a result, the legitimacy of each
government will someday be measured by international rules and processes.
We may not be quite there, and this norm is still challenged, but we can see the
outlines of this new world in which citizens of each state will look increasingly
to international law and organizations to guarantee their democratic entitlement.
146. See generally Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Administration in
East Timor, U.N. Doc. S/2000/53 (2000).
147. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, U.N.
Doc. (1997).
148. See generally GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 80.
149. See generally GOOD GOVERNANCE: THE IMF'S ROLE, supra note 80.
150. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 55.
151. See generally U.S. COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, DOCUMENT OF THE
COPENHAGEN MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF CSCE (1990).
152. The Harare Commonwealth Declaration, 1991, in COMMONWEALTH DECLARATIONS: DECLARATIONS
AND STATEMENTS ISSUED BY COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, 1971-1991 (1993) [hereinafter
Harare Commonwealth Declaration].
153. See EU Sets Conditionsfor New Lome Convention, TIMES OF ZAMBIA, Sept. 8, 1999, at I (stating that
the European Union has established good governance and respect for human rights and the rule of law as a
principal condition for the 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states in the New Lome Convention); see
also The Cotonou Agreement (2000), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/cotonou/agreement-en.htm.
154. See, e.g., CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, GOVERNMENT OF CANADA POLICY
FOR CIDA ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRATIZATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 21-22 (1996).
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V. CONSTITUTIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
Economic recovery and political stability in Africa must begin with a
recovery of those values which are acknowledged worldwide to be the true
foundation of every human society. These values are in turn the foundation of
social creativity and democratic governance.' 55 African states must establish
stable political and constitutional orders that promote development and aid the
eradication of poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance, while also guaranteeing
citizens the rule of law and equal protection of the law regardless of the
citizen's sex, color, or ethnic origin. 156  If the continent is to respond
successfully to the needs of its people and realize its dreams of rapid economic
development and political stability, it will have to apply careful thought to the
proper organization of political, economic, and administrative institutions to
ensure the proper governance of the nation-state.157 The aim should be to
achieve a constitutional order that is legitimate, credible, and enduring, and
which is structurally accessible to the people without compromising the
integrity and effectiveness of the process of governance. Constitutional
democracy in Africa will inevitably involve multiple or concurrent
constitutional orders rather than a single center of authority and power,
especially as African countries are characterized by large territorial, multi-
ethnic groupings, high rates of illiteracy, and poor communications
infrastructure. The international community can assist this process by creating
conditions that can bring about economic growth and development in Africa,
thereby consolidating any advances made in democratization.
In general terms, constitutional democracy concerns the following
principles: (1) the use of the constitution, as a supreme and fundamental law,
to regulate and limit the powers of government, and to secure the efficacy of
such limitations in actual practice; (2) assurance that the legitimacy of the
government is regularly established by requiring that governmental powers are
assumed or exercised only with the mandate of the people, given at periodic
intervals through free and fair elections or referenda that are executed and
155. See generally Obasanjo, supra note 117.
156. Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, Civitas Dei Africana, 1 ZAMBIA L.J. 65; cf. YOWERi KAGUTA MUSEVENI,
SOWING THE MUSTARD SEED: THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN UGANDA 188 (Elizabeth
Kanyogonya & Kevin Shillington eds., 1997).
157. Constitutions only pose a limit on possible actions, however, and do not therefore solve problems of
poverty, inequality, and violence in and of themselves. SIR GLOPPEN, SOUTH AFRICA: THE BATTLE OVER
THE CONSTITUTION 255-56 (1997).
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administered according to the constitution and well-defined electoral laws, and
in the context of a system-wide pluralism; (3) protection of the fundamental
rights of the people; (4) resolution of disputes, including disputes relating to the
constitutional propriety of legislation and other government acts, impartially, in
accordance with the constitution, and by ordinary courts which are independent
of the disputants; (5) the application of ordinary laws regarding the execution of
governance and adjudication of disputes in conformity with the limitations
imposed by the constitution and in accordance with the procedure for
lawmaking prescribed therein, and ensuring that such procedures conform to
internationally accepted norms; (6) clearly formulated and transparent processes
by which political leaders and government officials are held accountable for
their actions to the people; (7) assuring the safety and security of citizens and
the rule of law such that contracts can be fairly enforced, both between the
public and private operators and between private operators and the state; (8)
requiring public agencies to be responsive to the needs of the public and to
promote social and economic development for the benefit of all citizens in an
equitable manner; (9) providing information that permits accountability to be
achieved, laws to be carefully applied, markets to function, and people to be
creative and innovative;158 and (10) freedom of expression and association, and
the protection of human rights. Among all virtues, freedom of speech is
perhaps the one most necessary to the success of a democratic enterprise.
Unless a people tell one another the truth about what they know, think, and see,
they cheat themselves of their courage and destroy the possibility of freedom.
This is because democratic institutions do not renew themselves as effortlessly
as flowering trees. They require cultivation by people brave and honest enough
to admit their mistakes and to accept responsibility for even their most
inglorious acts.
The process of democratization, however, goes beyond the question of
simply installing a multi-party system. 5 9 The demands for a multi-party system
158. See generally James C.N. Paul, Developing Constitutional Orders in Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Unofficial Report, 1988 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1-34. As Singhvi described in his elaboration on the
South African Constitution: "[A] consistent framework of liberty and restraint is what the Constitutional
Assembly is called upon to create for South Africa so that the Constitution may at once prove to be the anchor,
the compass and the steering wheel for the ship of the state." Laxmi M. Singhvi, Democracy and the
Constitution, Presentation at the International Roundtable on Democratic Constitution Development, Pretoria,
S. Afr. (July 17-20, 1995).
159. In 1991, the Secretary-General of the United Nations wrote:
Elections in and of themselves do not constitute democracy. They are not an end but a
step, albeit an important and often essential one, on the path towards the
THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN AFRICA
are easier to meet than a comprehensive demand for democracy. Democracy
means the freedom of the people in their daily lives to determine their destinies,
encompassing, for example, their right to build their own organizations,
including residences, schools, and cultural institutions. To a large extent,
democracy is less of a formalistic system than an attitude. It is a way of
approaching the business of government, of setting up rules for government, of
creating enough checks and balances that the government is dependent less on
individuals and their personal whims, and more on systems and processes. 60
"Where citizens of a country have no sense of democracy and are unwilling or
unable to insist that their leaders deliver democracy ... a written constitution,
however eloquently it proclaims democracy, will be insufficient to guarantee
it.' t61 Additionally, democracy depends on certain values, such as tolerance
and trust, which cannot be secured in a written constitution. Rather, in order to
gain a foothold in a given country, these values depend on the political will of a
nation. The lack of these values can seriously undermine the democratic
enterprise. A clear example of this is President Mugabe in today's Zimbabwe,
where the law as it exists prohibits intimidation and protects property, and yet
the Government has been able to engage in land seizures.
t62
Thomas Paine defined a constitution as "not the act of a Government, but
of a people constituting a Government; and Government without a Constitution
is power without a right. ,163  A constitution is a thing antecedent to a
government, and a government is only the creature of a constitution. It
represents the basic structure of any organized society. Formal or informal,
written or unwritten, its existence, in whatever form, is inevitable.' 64 When one
democratization of societies and the realization of the right to take part in the
governance of one's country as enunciated in major international human rights
instruments. It would be unfortunate to confuse the end with the means and to forget
that democracy implies far more than the mere act of periodically casting a vote, but
covers the entire process of participation by citizens in the political life of their
country.
Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections: Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98(b), U.N. Doc. A/46/609 (1991).
160. Cf LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189-90 (3d ed. 1960).
161. Muna Ndulo, The 1996 Zambian Constitution and the Search for a Durable Democratic Constitutional
Order in Africa, 5 AFR. Y.B. INT'L L., 137, 174 (1997).
162. See Justice for All in Zimbabwe: An Advocacy Agenda for US Policy, 27 WASHINGTON NOTES ON
AFR. (Fall 2001).
163. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 182 (E.P. Dutton & Co., 1951) (1752).
164. OIWANG, supra note 98, at I (observing that "[t]he constitution is the scheme of organisation ofpublic
responsibilities which must be performed in any community. It identifies or prescribes the public organs of
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speaks of a modem constitution, however, notions of formality emerge.161 In
post-colonial Africa, the notion of a constitution has been reduced to that of a
single written document, a charter for the exercise of political power. Some
African scholars have criticized the move towards written constitutions and the
current constitutional arrangements on the grounds that they are based on or
follow too closely Western models of governance rather than African ideals of
governance, and have questioned the relevance of Western models to the
African condition. 166 Be that as it may, the impact of history seems clear: one
may interpret history or reinterpret it, but no one can repeal it. Moreover, while
transplanting European models into Africa might be problematic, the motives of
some of those who advocate "African solutions to African problems" are often
suspect. Many post-independence dictatorships, and indeed the African one-
party system of governance in Zambia, Kenya, Tanzania, and elsewhere in
Africa, were justified on the grounds that they were a variant of democracy best
suited to the peculiar African circumstances, and, at the same time, natural
facilitators for economic growth and promoters of national unity.167 Today it is
quite evident that these justifications had little to do with "African concepts of
governance" and more with the consolidation of political power through the
elimination of all political opposition. 68 After three decades of independence,
neither growth nor national unity has occurred for most African states.
the community and vests in them ... particular roles which are to be performed in the interest of the people as
a whole.").
165. Whatever form a constitution takes, however, its legitimacy and authority should be beyond question.
See GLOPPEN, supra note 157, at 38-39 (noting that "[i]n order to have a factual legitimacy and permanence,
the constitution must be perceived as a permanent element of social life. It must be regarded as the stable
rules of the game, which is more likely when it is believed to be resting on 'eternal' moral principles").
166. See RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 16 (1986) (commenting on the
issue of cultural relativism, social change and human rights, the author concludes that "[d]uring five centuries
of contact between Africa and the Western world, social changes have been introduced that increasingly
undermine any social-structural or cultural uniqueness Africa might once have possessed"); see also
PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY, supra note 74, at 7 (observing that colonialism "destroyed many indigenous
institutions by transforming non-European societies into European replicas"); cf Wing, supra note 14, at 690.
167. See Zimba, supra note 116, at 119. For example, in Kenya the post colonial government justified the
one party state on the basis that "[h]ere ... we seek out the modem constitutional form most suited to our
traditional needs ... Our people have always governed their affairs by looking to [an elected] Council of
Elders... headed by their own chosed leader, giving them strong and wise leadership. That tradition-which
is an Africanism-will be preserved in this new constitution." OJWANG, supra note 98, at 79 (quoting 3
MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFFICIAL REPORT, pt.
3, cols. 3381ff(1964)).
168. See Mubako, supra note 119, at 67.
THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN AFRICA
VI. DEVELOPING A VIABLE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER IN AFRICA
A serious search for viable constitutional arrangements that will bring
political stability in any African state must begin with a frank examination of
the specific social, political, and economic conditions present in African
countries. As Seidman has observed, most African constitution drafting that
took place in the post-colonial era can be analogized to "an elaborate buffet,
with elegant constitutional provisions from other, existing constitutions spread
across the glittering sideboard, from which the constitution-maker can fill her
place to her taste.' 69 "[S]entences, paragraphs, whole sections and chapters
float from one constitution to the next.' 70 Such drafting was accomplished
without any serious attempt to relate the process to the social and political
conditions in the countries concemed. Obviously, this is not an appropriate
approach for enacting legitimate constitutions that would adequately address
African problems while remaining consistent with Africa's cultural and
historical peculiarities. As Judge Chaskalson, President of the South African
Constitutional Court, has observed: "constitutions are shaped by history. What
is appropriate for one country in the light of its history, is not necessarily
appropriate in another country with a different history.' 71 Overall, one can
accurately say that "[m]any of these piecemeal constitutions have been
symbolic at best, totally irrelevant at worst.'
' 72
There are many conditions specific to the African situation which, unless
addressed, would negatively impact good governance. First, there is the need to
debate the type of society the country wishes to create. Is it a nonracial,
nonsexist, secular society? In 1993, before the South Africans developed their
constitution, they engaged in a serious debate as to what sort of society South
Africa was to be. 173 A clear image of the type of state that is envisaged is
important if questions of religion and the status of non-African races in the
society are not to be problematic. 174 Additionally, there is the need in each
country for sufficient national unity or cohesion to generate social and political
169. Seidman, supra note 11l, at 56.
170. Id.
171. Arthur Chaskalson, President of the South African Constitutional Court, Opening Speech to the
International Roundtable on Democratic Constitution Development, Pretoria, S. Afr. (July 17-20, 1995).
172. Wing, supra note 14, at 690.
173. See Nelson Mandela, Foreword to THE POST-APARTHEID CONSTITUTIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH
AFRICA'S BASIC LAw, at vii (Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds., 2001).
174. Part of the land issue in Zimbabwe seems to arise because of the lack of clarity as to whether the
country accepts white Zimbabweans as nationals entitled to the same rights as black Zimbabweans.
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power. This unity and cohesion must be strong enough to enable the diverse
peoples in each state to achieve purposes of well-being and development that
are beyond their reach as separate units.
African states also face the need to accommodate the vast ethnic diversity
that exists on the continent, and to acknowledge institutionally the intensity of
the attachment that Africans have to their ethnicity. Unfortunately, in much of
the continent the pattern of ethnic relations has been characterized by growing
self-consciousness and, at times, intolerance, intransigence, and
intemperance. 75  Against this background, the issue of ethnicity could
potentially be destabilizing to the democratization process. Democracy may
magnify rather than reduce the adverse effects of ethnicity. African states also
need to accommodate the significant racial minorities that exist in their
countries. Constitutions must deal with this fact sensitively, not only
consciously acknowledging the fears and apprehensions of racial minority
groups, but also meeting their legitimate demands and involving them, in a
meaningful and satisfying way, in the political systems that have evolved and
also in the nation-building process. The issue of ethnic or racial minority
protection will not be solved by simply ignoring it. It has to be addressed in a
pro-active manner. Another condition that complicates the search for viable
constitutional arrangements is the newness and artificiality of African states
which were, for the most part, recently and arbitrarily created during the
colonial period.
Additionally, the quest for a viable constitution must anticipate and prepare
for the general unfamiliarity of most Africans with the philosophy and
machinery of modem democratic governance. A viable constitution must also
accommodate the general economic and social backwardness that exists in these
countries, and the consequential need and urgency for development on all fronts
simultaneously. Moreover, African constitutions cannot ignore the
disproportionate economic and social importance of public office to individuals
in the midst of widespread poverty and ignorance. The search must also
recognize the temptations of arrogance, discrimination, abuse of power, and
corruption assailing persons in office, 176 and must face the influence of money
in the electoral process, especially in economies where a large percentage of
175. Emmanuel Tatah Mentan, Colonial Legacies, Democratization and the Ethnic Question in Cameroon,
UNESCO Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Programme (1999), at http://www.hri.ca/partners/
aga/publication/livrelegacies.shtml.
176. THABO MBEKI, REMARKS AT THE DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY JAN. 24-FEB. 20
1995, REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. 10 (1995) [hereinafter DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY].
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voters are unemployed.1 77 The situation is worsened by the fact that most
opposition parties in Africa lack resources to operate effectively; thus, the
funding of political parties should also be addressed. The principle of
government funding of political parties is well established across the
democratic world. 178 In the absence of state funding arrangements, the party in
power has an undue advantage, as it has access to state resources and
institutions to push its political agenda. Additionally, there is the problem of
cultural values and traditional roles assigned to women that perpetuate the
inequality of the sexes. 179 As Mill observed, only complete equality between
men and women in all legal, political, and social arrangements can create the
proper conditions for human freedom and a democratic way of life.180 The goal
should be, as the Beijing Conference declared: "[to remove] all the obstacles to
women's active participation in all spheres of public life and private life
through a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural, and political
decisionmaking.''
l1 l
There is also a need to build a free and vibrant press. Only a free press can
provide citizens with a range of information and opinions on the actions of the
government, including fiercely critical views. This enables citizens to "choose
their representatives in an informed manner and to force state officials to
respond to the desires of the public.' ', 82 In addition, a free press, by exposing
wrongdoing, encourages accountable behavior by public officials and
politicians and discourages corruption. Further, a free flow of accurate
information has economic implications in that a competitive market economy
177. See generally Muna Ndulo, Political Parties and Democratic Rule in Africa, in GOVERNANCE,
DEVELOPMENT, AND GLOBALIZATION: A TRIBUTE TO LAWRENCE TSHUMA 165 (Julio Faundez et al. eds.,
2000).
178. See Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Political Funding in Europe, presented at the International IDEA
Conference "Towards Sustainable Democratic Institutions in Southern Africa," Gaborone, Botswana (May 8-
10, 2000).
179. See generally H.J. SIMONS, AFRICAN WOMEN: THEIR LEGAL STATUS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1968). See
also Muna Ndulo, Widows Under Zambian Customary Law and the Response of the Courts, 18 COMP. &
INT'L. L.J. S. AFR. 90, 102 (1985); Thando Nhlapo, The African Family and Women's Rights: Friends or
Foes?, 1991 ACTAJURIDICA 135, 145-46.
180. See JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 1 (1869). For a discussion of Mill on this issue,
see DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 113-14 (2d ed., 1996) (1987). The inequality of the sexes has
deprived Africa of a vast pool of talent. See generally Penelope E. Andrews, Affirmative Action in South
Africa: Some Theoretical and Practical Issues, in THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM A GENDER
PERSPECTIVE 49 (Sandra Liebenberg ed., 1995).
181. The Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action, U.N. Fourth World Conference on Women, at 17,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 (1995).
182. See OWEN M. FiSS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE
POWER 142 (1996).
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requires that economic actors have access to relevant, timely, and reliable
information. The less available or credible the information, the greater the
uncertainty and risk, and therefore the cost, of committing capital or labor. In
many African countries, for example, Zambia and Zimbabwe, governments
continue to own newspapers. As many of the papers are unable to survive
without government subsidies, they practice self-censorship in order not to run
foul of the hand that feeds them.
Another complication is the need to define and assess the role of the
military in African states. It is essential for a democratic society that the
military be respectful of the democratic process. In some parts of Africa,
especially West Africa, the military has proved to be the greatest threat to the
development of democratic governance. The examples of Nigeria, Gambia, and
Sierra Leone illustrate this point. 183 There is also the need to encourage the
development of a viable civil society. Civil society in democracies provides the
checks and balances that assist in the regulation of governments. In Africa,
years of one-party systems of governance, military regimes, and poverty have
hindered the development of powerful civic organizations that could act as
countervailing forces to governments. The role of traditional institutions in
modem African political systems must also be addressed. Finally, a serious
search for viable constitutional arrangements must respond to the need to
decentralize power. The search must address the distribution of power between
the center and the regional level entities.
A constitution that aspires to be legitimate and authoritative as the
fundamental law of any state in Africa must address the issues identified above
if it is to succeed. A constitution affects the lives of all citizens and therefore
ought to address the concerns of all citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, color,
gender, or station in life. As the Chief Justice of South Africa, Justice Ismail
Mohammed, observed in a judgment in Namibia:
The constitution of a nation is not simply a statute which
mechanically defines the structures of government and the
relations between the government and the governed. It is a
"mirror reflecting the national soul", the identification of the
ideals and aspirations of a nation; the articulation of the values
bonding its people and disciplining its government.
184
183. See Anglin, supra note 2.
184. State v. Acheson, 1991 N.R. 1, 3B (Namib.).
THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN AFRICA
A constitution ought therefore to be an autobiography of the nation. It should
reflect the lives of all its citizens, young or old, male or female, rich or poor,
straight or gay. People should be able to look at the constitution and see their
lives within its pages and their protection within its words. The people must
feel a sense of ownership of the document before they can respect, defend, and
obey it.18 5 Van der Vyver has observed that "superimposed constitutional
formulae, or constitutional arrangements that.., do not address the real causes
of discontent ... are sure to generate their own legitimacy crisis.'
186
Beyond the essential ingredients of a democracy, a democratic constitution
should be seen as a liberating document-one that not only limits the powers of
the state and its institutions, but guarantees the kinds of liberties that will make
the pursuit of happiness and self-fulfillment a reality for the people. It should
empower the young, as well as women and other historically disadvantaged
groups. It should guarantee equality of opportunity for all citizens irrespective
of gender, race, religion or ethnic background. Equal opportunity for all is a
mark of true liberation. It ensures that benefits of economic development
accrue to the many and not to the few, and that all citizens have a chance to live
up to their potential and to achieve self-fulfillment.
VII. DEVOLUTION OF POWER TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES
In a typical African state, a large percentage of the people remain outside of
the formal structures of the state. They rely on self-help for law enforcement
and self-reliance for their survival. Many of these people operating outside the
formal structures of government are in rural areas. There is a critical need for
the devolution of power, which is a means of not only improving governance
and enhancing the accountability of leaders, but also making the state a
participant in people's lives.
As was discussed earlier, post-independence African governments, like
their colonial predecessors, tend to be overly centralized. 187 In the institutional
sense, centralization of power refers to the constitutional concentration of
power in the hands of a few executive offices and, therefore, a few people,
185. When India launched its constitution-making exercise in the wake of the advent of independence,
India's leader Jawaharl Nehru described it as India's "tryst with destiny." See Singhvi, supra note 158, at 2.
186. Johan D. van der Vyver, Constitutional Optionsfor Post-Apartheid South Africa, 40 EMORY L.J. 745,
822 (1991); see also ZIYAD MOTALA, CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 232-42 (1994).
187. See supra notes 97-121 and accompanying text (discussing Africa's colonial legacy).
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greatly undermining the constitutional importance of courts, legislatures, and
subregional governments. 188 These effects are usually reinforced by the
tendency of most governments to concentrate the most critical human and
financial resources at headquarters, while leaving rural administration with a
lean administrative structure that lacks adequate resources or discretionary
authority.' 89 A major feature of any centralized state is its preoccupation with
bureaucracy and planning and, hence, the preference for concentrated
structures, rather than diversified and decentralized institutions that emphasize
the grassroots empowerment of the people.' 90 Another feature is financial
centralization. The central state collects all of the most important and buoyant
tax resources and makes only scant funds available to subnational organs. 19 1
Compounding this problem, financial transfers to subregional organs are
accomplished via grants, which are given sporadically rather than on a regular
and systematic basis.
Effective devolution of power to local authorities requires local
communities endowed with democratically constituted decision-making bodies
and possessed of a wide degree of autonomy with regard to their
responsibilities, the ways and means by which those responsibilities are
exercised, and the financial resources required for their fulfillment. Devolution
of power to local communities has been recognized in many parts of the world
as one of the cornerstones of democracy. 92 The right of citizens to participate
in the conduct of public affairs is more directly exercised at local levels. The
existence of local authorities who are given real responsibilities can provide an
administrative set-up which is both effective and close to the citizen. Unlike
more centralized systems, local government provides for more flexible
responses attuned to local needs. It opens opportunities for innovation and
experimentation in policy formulation and delivery. It can alleviate the
workload of over-stretched central government, something which is especially
188. Cf B.C. Chikulo, 'Decentralization in Centralism': An Analysis of the Zambian Experience (1964-
1981), in ISSUES [N ZAMBIAN DEVELOPMENT 341 (Kwaku Osei-Hwedie & Muna Ndulo eds., 1985).
189. Seeid. at 341-42.
190. See id. at 341-45, 347.
191. See id.
192. See EUROPEAN CHARTER OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT, Oct. 15, 1985, pmbl., E.T.S. No. 122,
available at http://conventions.coe.intTreaty/en/Treaties/Html/122.htm.
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important in Africa in view of the numerous tasks of development and
transformation that face a typical African government.
9 3
Very few current African political systems have made any serious efforts to
decentralize power. 194 Even among those systems which profess commitment
to decentralization, there is a wide gap between political rhetoric and reality. 95
African governments tend to co-opt or, in extreme cases, abolish social
institutions that they determine to be harmful to their interpretation of nation-
building.196 In reality, this includes anything that threatens the ruling party's
hold on power.197 Current arrangements not only waste resources, but also
encourage corruption in central government institutions and lower the ability of
lower-level government institutions to expand or even to maintain existing
infrastructures.1
98
In addition, because power is not decentralized, the struggle to control the
central government becomes a matter of life and death among the political
leadership.' 99 Observers have noted that African states tend to be strong in
those areas in which they ought to be weak (repressive power), and weak where
they ought to be strong (popular mobilization and responsiveness). 200 The
process of democratization must go hand in hand with that of devolution of
power to local communities. It is not enough to have democracy at the national
level; it must be complemented at the subnational and community levels. State
structures must work with society-based organizations. Societal and state
institutions must exist as partners in social engineering. They must seek to
empower the ordinary people in matters of governance. As is so often pointed
out, democracy means governance by the people for the people. Community-
based social and political institutions ought to be the building blocks of a new
and effective African polity that can deliver a better life for African people.
193. See Richard Simeon, The Structures of Intergovemmental Relations, paper presented at the
International Roundtable on Democratic Constitution Development Conference, Pretoria, S. Afr. (July 17-20,
1995).
194. See generally Chikulo, supra note 188.
195. Id. at 340.
196. See generally Patrick McAuslan, Good Governance and Aid in Africa, 40 J. AFR. L. 168 (1996);
Stephen Chan, Humanism, Intellectualism and the Left in Zambia, in ISSUES IN ZAMBIAN DEVELOPMENT 290
(Kwaku Osei-Hwedie & Muna Ndulo eds., 1985).
197. See generally McAuslan, supra note 196.
198. See Reyntjens, supra note 14, at 52, 54.
199. See, e.g., id. at 48.
200. Cf James C.N. Paul, Developing Constitutional Orders in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Unofficial Report,
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 5 (1988).
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Any examination of the modalities affecting the devolution of power in
Africa must, among other things, address the future of traditional institutions of
governance in modem African political systems.20' There is a consensus
among most Africans that traditional leaders, such as chiefs, should have a role
in the governance of the state.2 °2 But the exact role they should play is a source
of disagreement and, as a result, their role in most African countries remains
largely undefined. There are various ways traditional leaders could be
accommodated in constitutional arrangements. For instance, they could be
incorporated into the local government system and form the nucleus of that
system. This could, quite conceivably, enhance the legitimacy of local
government structures in the rural areas. In these areas, traditional leaders
provide the link between the people and the external world, that is, the
government. Colonial authorities were fairly successful in using traditional
institutions to their advantage, and perhaps modem African leaders can learn
from that experience. Reaching rural communities in Africa effectively
requires one to confront this reality.20 3 Traditional leaders could be used to
reach out to small communities and build national consensus and cohesion.2°
In any event, it makes sense to find a place in the national political system
for structures and institutions that cannot be wished away. The reality in many
African countries is that the majority of people in the rural population live their
lives within a traditional social and cultural context.2 05 The people in the rural
areas, in the absence of legitimate local institutions, have been driven to rely on
informal institutions for day-to-day ordering of their affairs and of society,
201. See generally Nana Akuoko Sarpong, Local Government Structures, Managements and Elections,
paper presented at the International Roundtable on Democratic Constitution Development Conference,
Pretoria, S. Afr. (July 17-20, 1995). At various points, some African countries have abolished chieftaincy
only to re-instate it. Tanzania and Uganda are cases in point. In the South African constitutional negotiations,
the question of what to do with traditional institutions was a major point of discussion. In the end, the South
African constitution provides for the recognition of traditional institutions but leaves it to national legislation
to provide for the role of traditional leadership as an institution. This does not really integrate the traditional
institutions into the mainstream South African post-apartheid political system. See S. AFR. CONsT., arts. 211,
212. The Ugandan Constitution states, "Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the institution of
traditional leader or cultural leader may exist in any area of Uganda in accordance with the culture, customs
and traditions or wishes and aspirations of the people to whom it applies." UGANDA CONST., art. 246(1).
202. See Thandabantu Nhlapo, Accommodating Traditional Forms of Governance in a Constitutional
Democracy: A Motivation, paper presented at the International Roundtable on Democratic Constitution
Development Conference, Pretoria, S. Afr. (July 17-20, 1995).
203. See generally LUGARD, supra note 20 (describing colonial use of traditional institutions).
204. See Nhlapo, supra note 202.
205. See id.
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especially in the area of dispute resolution.2 °6 It would therefore be a mistake to
sideline traditional institutions and establish wholly modem institutions that
will have to establish their legitimacy with the people over time. Since
democracy means involving the various communities within a country in the
governance of their affairs, it is imperative that rural communities not be
ignored in any democratic arrangement. Every effort should be made to
integrate traditional institutions into the modem political structures so that all
institutions are made accountable and responsive to the people. The
accommodation of traditional governance within the modem political systems
of governance would actually enhance rather than diminish the state's vital
interests in public order and stability.
While accommodating traditional structures in modem political systems,
one should not ignore the fact that these institutions can at times be oppressive,
exploitative, discriminatory, and intolerant, especially with respect to women
and children.20 7 Since the goal is to establish a democratic order, the need to
incorporate traditional institutions into the modern political system cannot take
precedence over the needs of a democratic society.20 8 With regard to aspects of
these institutions that are gender-discriminatory, governments must address the
areas that need reform, discarding the discriminatory aspects of traditional
institutions and confronting the traditional values that underpin gender
209discrimination and authoritarianism.
VIII. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
As observed, free and fair elections are indispensable elements of
democratic governance. In addition, they are the obvious and traditional way of
ensuring accountability and providing an institutional framework for the
peaceful resolution of conflicts among competing political parties. 2  However,
206. See generally GLUCKMAN, supra note 92.
207. See generally Muna Ndulo, Liability of a Paramour in DamagesforAdultery in Customary Law, AFR.
SOC. RES. 655 (1979); Nhlapo, supra note 179; Penelope Andrews, Uhuru at Last! Now WhatAbout The
Women? Women and Rights in the New South Africa, in THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS (Penelope Andrews & Stephen Ellmann eds., 1998).
208. See DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 176, at 11.
209. Customary law is the source for much of this discrimination. South Africa and Namibia have
provisions in their constitutions which render invalid customary law that conflicts with the constitution. This
practice should be emulated. It gives the courts the ability to declare gender-insensitive customs and practices
illegal and unenforceable. S. AFR. CONST. art. 211(3); NAMIB. CONST. art. 66(1).
210. See, e.g., Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the
CSCE, June 29, 1990, 5; see also, e.g., Universal Declaration on Human Rights, supra note 68, art. 21;
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when the rules of the game are not universally accepted and respected, the
process becomes controversial and a source of conflict rather than a mechanism
for resolving strife.211 Elections must be organized in a manner that maximizes
participation of all stake-holders in the political system. Unfortunately, many
elections in Africa have been disputed and have sometimes led to conflict rather
than the advancement of democracy. In the Congo (Brazzaville), for instance,
the 1992 election precipitated an incipient civil war between supporters of rival
presidential contenders.212 The April 2002 elections in Zimbabwe were a
travesty of democracy.213 The opposition was harassed and prevented from
campaigning for the vote. Similarly, the May 1998 elections in Lesotho led to a
total breakdown of law and order, and required the intervention of the Southern
African Development Community's military forces.21 4 The 1996 Zambian
elections215 led to unprecedented tensions and to an attempted coup, and the
2001 elections were disputed and are now in the courts.216 Such results largely
because national elections are often manipulated by the party in power and
often result in substantial minorities being unrepresented in Parliament or
feeling cheated by the process.21 7 In addition, many elections have been riddled
with irregularities not always calculated to defraud, but resulting from the sheer
inability of the state to conduct effectively conduct such a formidable
managerial and logistical undertaking.21 8 As Chazon has observed: "In Africa,
elections provide ritual occasions for sanctioning the existing power
American Declaration of Rights and Duties, supra note 125, art. XX; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights supra note 127, art. 25; Council of Europe, Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms March 20, 1952, art. 3; American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, art. 16; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Rules of Procedure, June 27,
1981, art. 13.
211. See Anglin, supra note 2.
212. Seeid.
213. See 'Massive Rigging' in Zimbabwe Poll, BBC NEWS, Mar. 26, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
world/africa1 895289.stm [hereinafter Massive Rigging].
214. South Africa and Botswana intervened in Lesotho to restore law and order after an election led to
conflict.
215. See generally Zambia: Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, 8 HUM. RTs. WATCH
(1996); Zambia: No Model for Democracy, 10 HUM. RTS. WATCH (1998).
216. See generally COALITION 2001, THE DECEMBER 27, 2001 TRIPARTITE ELECTIONS IN ZAMBIA 3.0
(2002), at http://afronet.org.za/monitor206/supplement.htm.
217. See, e.g., id.
218. See generally END OF APARTHEID, supra note 142; see also A Democratic, Non-Racial and United
South Africa, Final Report of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the
United Nations Secretary-General (May 26, 1994) [hereinafter A Democratic, Non-Racial and United South
Africa]. Both reports discuss difficulties encountered in organizing the South African elections, which were
due to the gigantic nature of the task of organizing the first-ever democratic elections.
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constellation but allow for precious few opportunities for affecting the
composition of the ruling circles or policy outcomes., 219 The utility of elections
is further undermined by the fact that the electoral process is not often
accompanied by the building of institutions that foster accountability and
greater transparency in the governance of the country.220 The challenge here is
to make elections an effective tool for choosing representatives of the people, as
well as an integral process in the construction of a democratic state. At a
minimum, national elections must be organized in a manner that ensures the
maximum participation of all sectors of the population in the political system. 22'
The design of an electoral system is increasingly recognized as a key lever
that can be used in promoting of political accommodation and stability in
ethnically divided societies. As Reynolds has observed, "[a]lthough
appropriate electoral laws are insufficient to ensure stability and good
governance in divided societies, poorly designed laws can entrench societal
divisions and exacerbate preexisting conflict., 222 In many African countries,
election results show the main political party as having overwhelming support
in a core region. This is because, as Nwabueze has observed:
For [most African politicians] the tribe was the base for
political activity and tribal sentiment the focus of appeal,
which inevitably disabled them from rising above tribal
interest and pressures in the administration of government.
The result was that the government came to be regarded as one
huge cake, already baked, which it was the duty of a political
leader to secure for his tribe as large a share as possible.
Every question, whether it be the award of scholarships or
contracts, appointments in the public service, economic
development or the siting of industrial projects, was viewed
219. NAOMI CHAZON ET AL., POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA (3d ed. 1988).
220. See. e.g., Zambia: Elections and Human Rights in the Third Republic, 8 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFR.
REP. (1996) (reporting on the 1996 Zambian elections) [hereinafter Zambia: Elections and Human Rights].
The May 1998 elections in Lesotho, which had been pronounced as "free and fair by international observers"
and in which the opposition won only one seat, were later found to have been riddled with irregularities by the
Langa Commission of Inquiry. Massive Rigging, supra note 213. The elections led to a crisis which caused a
complete collapse of law and order in Lesotho, and resulted in military intervention by the Southern African
Development Community.
221. See Larry Garber, Establishing a Legal Framework for Elections, Address at the Conference on Free
and Fair Elections, Center for Development Studies (CDS) and the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs (NDI), (Mar. 12-14, 1993), Capetown, S. Aft.
222. Andrew Reynolds, Constitutional Engineering in Southern Africa, 6 J. AFR. DEMO. 86 (1995).
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from the standpoint of tribal advantage, and support or
opposition to it depended upon whether or not it advanced the
interest of one's tribe. 3
The system of winner-take-all, which is applied in most African countries,
tends to reinforce this kind of approach to politics, as it creates permanent
losers and permanent winners. The winner-take-all system is "based on the
principle of territorial representation, emphasizing the relationship between
voter and representative. ' ,224  The size of a party's representation is thus
determined not only by the number of votes, received, but also by their
geographical concentration. Should a party's votes be too widely scattered or
too highly concentrated, it could be under-represented in parliament. In such a
situation, groups that are numerically small can never win an election. They
therefore remain permanently aggrieved. Such a system will be unable to
implement democratic principles in deeply divided societies that are
nonhomogeneous. 5
African countries need to re-examine the possibility of using the
proportional representation system in elections in their ethnically and racially
divided societies in order to enhance democracy and avoid conflict.22 6 In a
proportional representation system, the political parties compete for support in
multi-member constituencies and the division of seats is determined by the
actual support that a party receives. The main objective of proportional
representation, in contrast to the winner-take-all system, is to ensure that there
is a proportional relationship between the votes received and the seats allocated
to a particular party. The net effect of proportional representation is that all
political parties, not only the majority or larger parties, are represented in
223. Nwabueze, supra note 111, at 24.
224. See Bertus de Villiers, An Electoral System for the New South Africa, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN
THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 29 (Alexander Johnston et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN
THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA].
225. See THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 195 (1987) (arguing that it seems
that a national culture unified both ideologically and ethnically may be a precondition for the successful
working of the plurality and majority methods).
226. Cf Antonio Nadais, Choice of Electoral Systems, in NEW DEMOCRATIC FRONTIER 190-91 (Larry
Garber & Eric Bjomlund eds., 1992); see also LMi GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS
SETBACK INTO A NEW VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 117 (1998) (noting how proportional representation can be
"less polarizing than conventional race-conscious districting." The author gives examples "where not only
blacks and women but Republicans had been elected for the first time when Chilton County, Alabama,
adopted cumulative voting, a strategy also used to elect corporate boards throughout America").
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accordance with their support base. 227 The experiences of South Africa and
Namibia suggest that in ethnically divided societies, the system of proportional
representation in one form or another is more appropriate than that of the
winner-take-all system. 22 If minorities are to accept their legislature, they must
be adequately represented in it. Winner-take-all elections do not sufficiently
address this issue.229 Without effective representation, a majority will have
little incentive to address the grievances of the minority.
The use of a winner-take-all system in the 1994 elections in South Africa
would have had a number of negative consequences. The immediate result
would have been a denial of parliamentary representation to critical minority
parties such as the Freedom Party, the Democratic Party and the Pan Africanist
Congress (PAC).23° Proportional representation allowed the South African
parliament to reflect fairly South African society as a whole. 23' Nonetheless, a
maj or criticism of proportional representation is that it allows extremist parties
to gain representation in parliament, thereby gaining legitimacy in society.
232
There is also the perception that the system leads to coalitions and therefore to
weak governments.233 These objections, however, are far outweighed by the
benefits the system contributes to stability and representation of all population
groups in a country. No government, not even one with a large majority, would
be able to work effectively if its society were perpetually on the verge of
breakdown, aggravated by threats of extra-constitutional action by under-
represented minorities. Moreover, it would appear that proportional
representation, rather than the winner-take-all system, is more in line with
227. There are many variations of both winner-take-all and proportional representation systems. See, e.g.,
de Villiers, supra note 224, at 33.
228. See Andrd du Pisani, Namibia: The Making ofa New State in the Region, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING
IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA supra note 224, at 234. But see Guy Lardeyret, The Problem with PR, 2 J.
DEMO. 30, 32 (1991) (arguing that proportional representation tends to reproduce ethnic cleavages in the
legislature).
229. See W. ARTHUR LEWIS, POLITICS IN WEST AFRICA 71 (1965) ("The surest way to kill the idea of
democracy in a plural society is to adopt the Anglo-American electoral system of first-past-the-post .... [t]he
vagaries of plurality elections would produce racially exclusive and geographically parochial governments that
would exploit a 'mandate' from a plurality of the electorate in order to discriminate systematically against
minorities.").
230. See A Democratic, Non-Racial and United South Africa, supra note 218 (providing the results of the
1994 South African elections).
231. The results of the 1994 South African elections were as follows, with number of seats in brackets:
African National Congress (252); National Party (82); Inkatha Freedom Party (43); Freedom Front (9);
Democratic Party (7); Pan African Congress (5); and African Christian Democratic Party (2). See id.
232. See Nadais, supra note 226, at 193.
233. See GLOPPEN, supra note 157, at 100-01.
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traditional African political organization. Traditional African society insisted
that major decisions affecting the whole community should not be made by a
bare majority of the society. Bentsi-Enchill has observed that "[e]verything
should be done, our ancestors insisted, on achieving the consensus of all key
sectors" of the community before a decision was made.234
After the choice of the electoral system, the second fundamental choice is
whether to have a presidential or a parliamentary system. In a majority of
African countries (including Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Ghana, and
Kenya), the president is elected directly in a national election. 235 Good
constitutional design for divided societies would seem to militate against
directly elected presidents. Shugart and Carey have identified three key traits of
presidential systems that often have negative consequences: temporal rigidity,
236
majoritarianism, and dual democratic legitimacy. In a divided society
without a history of stable democracy, there is no assurance that the losers of a
presidential race will accept defeat in what amounts to a zero-sum game. One
observer from the U.S. State Department laid the blame for the 1994 collapse of
peace plans in Angola, and the bloody conflict that ensued, largely on the
country's presidential system. 237 She observed that because Dos Santos and
Savimbi were vying for the only prize worth having, it was certain that Savimbi
would inevitably resume his violent struggle after losing the election. 38 In
Nigeria, the all-or-nothing structure of the 1993 presidential election made it
easy for the military to succeed in annulling the election before the final results
had been officially announced.239 Unsuccessful candidates had no immediate
stake in the political outcome, and many readily acquiesced in the election's
annulment in the hope of being able to run again.24 ° In the Congo (Brazzaville)
in 1992, Sassou Nguesso succumbed to popular pressure and permitted multi-
party elections in which he stood as a candidate for president. After losing the
234. Bentsi-Enchill, Civitas dei Africana, supra note 156, at 72.
235. Some, like Kenya, moved away from the parliamentary system. At Kenya's independence, the
president was an elected member of Parliament and his term of office was tied to that of the National
Assembly. See OJWANG, supra note 98, at 79. The Zambian Constitution provides for direct elections for the
president. See ZAMBIA CONST. arts. 34, 35.
236. MATHEW SHUGART & JOHN CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND
ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 28-43 (1999).
237. Ann Reid, Conflict Resolution in Africa: Lessons from Angola, INR Foreign Affairs Brief, U.S.
Department of State, Apr. 6, 1993.
238. Id.
239. See Ian Campbell, Nigeria s Failed Transition: The 1993 Presidential Election, 12 J. CONTEMP. AFR.
STUD. 179, 182 (1994).
240. See id. at 183; see also Reid, supra note 237.
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election, he became obsessed with ousting his successor, Pascal Lissouba. He
mounted a military campaign against his successor until he succeeded in
regaining power in June of 1998.241 In the 2002 elections in Madagascar, Marc
Ravalomanana was sworn in as president, but his victory was disputed by long
standing leader Didier Ratsiraka. As a result the country is "divided between
Mr. Ravalomanana's supporters based in the capital ... and those backing Mr.
Ratsiraka who control coastal areas.,
242
Directly-elected presidents interpret their mandate as distinct from that of
the members of parliament and as entitling them to supervise parliament in its
work. Another danger of a presidential system is that a directly-elected
president tends to be pressured into ethnic or regional exclusivity. 243  Such
presidents have a great incentive to offer special privilege to their own ethnic or
regional groups as a means of ensuring re-election through a simple majority or
plurality of votes.244 The arrangement in which the president is elected by
parliament is more conducive to formal and informal power-sharing
arrangements. In such an arrangement, "[e]ven without grand coalition
requirements, minority parties can influence the choice of president and the
composition of the cabinet, particularly when there is no clear parliamentary
majority., 245 Given the factors discussed above, it would seem that a president
elected by members of parliament would foster the feeling of greater
participation in the election of all stake holders in the country as represented by
parliament. South Africa2 46 and Eritrea2 47 are examples of African countries
that presently follow this arrangement. The adoption of the parliamentary
system for the election of a president would be an extension of the proportional
representation system to the elections for the office of president.
241. See Anglin, supra note 2.
242. See Madagascar Rivals Reject Peace Plan, BBC NEWS, June 10, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk./1/hi/
world/africa/2036580.stm.
243. See Nwabueze, supra note I l1.
244. See id.
245. GLOPPEN, supra note 157, at 217-18.
246. S. AFR. CONST. art. 86.
247. Article 41 of the Eritrean Constitution provides that "[t]he President shall be elected from amongst the
members of the National Assembly by an absolute majority vote of its members. A candidate for the office of
the President must be nominated by at least 20 percent vote of all the members of the National Assembly."
ERa. CONST. art. 41.
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IX. LEGITIMACY AND THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A CONSTITUTION
The process of adopting a constitution is as important as its substance.24 8
The process must be legitimate and, in order for it to be legitimate, it must be
inclusive.24 9 It should represent the interests of all the people in the country,
and the people must be made to feel that they own both the process and the end
product.2 50 A constitution should be the product of the integration of ideas of
all the major stakeholders in a country, including all political parties both
within and outside parliament, organized civil society, and individuals in the
society. 251 Constitution-making structures must be open to the views and
opinions of all stakeholders, who must be given a meaningful opportunity to
make their views known. If a constitution is to represent the aspirations and
dreams of all the people, deliberate steps must be taken to ensure that those
who might be disempowered, and any other marginalized groups, become part
of the process.252 The process must be transparent; that is, it must be
undertaken in full view of the country and the international community. The
constitutional text must be in a simple language that is accessible to all. It
should therefore also be translated into all the major languages spoken in a
given state. A constitution that is perceived as imposed on a large segment of
the population, or as adopted through the manipulation of the process by some
of the stakeholders, is unlikely to gain sufficient popularity or legitimacy to
endure the test of time. The process of constitution-making cannot and should
not be determined solely by the government of the day, but by all stakeholders.
The post-independence constitutions in Africa were the result of
agreements reached at independence conferences that followed nationalist
248. See Muna Ndulo & Robert Kent, Constitutionalism in Zambia: Past, Present and Future, 40 J. AFR.
L. 256, 257 (1996).
249. In developing the constitution of South Africa, the Constitutional Assembly strove to ensure that the
general public was involved in the development of the constitution and believed that it belonged to them. In a
study carried out in mid-1996, "60 per cent of the adult population had heard about the Constitutional
Assembly ... [w]hen asked whether they believed that the Constitutional Assembly would treat their
submission seriously, 41 per cent responded positively. . . [a]n amazing 57 per cent of the respondents
believed that the constitution would guarantee freedom and equality for all South Africans." GLOPPEN, supra
note 157, at 264-65. But a word of caution: "[t]he high confidence in the process, in the ability of the
constitution to reflect everybody's views, and to guarantee freedom and equality, could also prove to be a
double-edged sword, if expectations turn into disillusionment." Id. at 266.
250. See C. Ramaphosa, Remarks at the South African Constitutional Assembly, in DEBATES OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 176, at 7.
251. See Ndulo & Kent, supra note 248, at 256-57.
252. See DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, supra note 176, at 10.
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campaigns for independence.25 3 The texts of the constitutions bequeathed to
the new states followed colonial models developed by the various colonial
powers for newly independent states.25 4 Mozambique, Namibia, Angola, and
South Africa followed different paths because protracted liberation struggles
preceded independence in those countries.255 One of the unfortunate legacies of
the colonial model has been the extreme level of detail in African
constitutions.25 6 For example, a typical African constitution contains hundreds
of detailed provisions, which might undermine development and the ability to
meet the needs of a rapidly changing society.
25 7
Since independence, the practice in many African countries has been to
adopt new constitutions through the use of "constitutional commissions. ' 25 8
The commissions, composed of a number of individuals appointed by the
government in power, typically tour the country soliciting public views of
possible constitutional arrangements and then recommend a draft constitution
for adoption by the national legislature. In many countries, this approach fails
to produce durable and lasting constitutions.259 In Zambia, the opposition
parties continue to dispute the constitution adopted in May 1996, on the
grounds that it does not reflect the views of the people and that the process was
manipulated by the ruling party.260 Experiences such as this suggest that the
use of constitutional commissions is susceptible to manipulation by the
government and often results in the imposition of its preferred constitutional
model.26' Matters are made worse by the common perception that such
253. See, e.g., Report of the Constitutional Review Commission, Government of the Republic of Zambia,
Lusaka, Zambia § 2 (1995) [hereinafter Constitutional Review Commission, Zambia]. Chapter two of the
report reviews the constitutional history of Zambia. The 1964 Zambian Constitution was provided for in
Schedule 2 to the Zambian Independence Order, 1964, promulgated by Her Majesty in Council under the
provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890.
254. See, e.g,, ZAMB. CONST.
255. The countries in question did not have colonial models. See GLOPPEN, supra note 157, at 69
(reviewing the South African process).
256. See, e.g., ZAMB. CONST. (1991) (containing a total of 113 articles).
257. The 1973 Constitution of Zambia is 291 pages long and contains over 130 articles. Each of the articles
has several subsections.
258. See, e.g., Constitutional Review Commission, Zambia, supra note 253, § I; UNITED REPUBLIC OF
TANZANIA, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DEMOCRATIC ONE-
PARTY STATE I (1965); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 119, at 1.
259. Ibrahim Jurna, Constitution Making in Tanzania: The Case for a National Conference, in LAW AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN EAST AFRICA 393 (Joseph Oloka-Onyango et al. eds., 1996).
260. See Report of the Citizens Convention on the Draft Constitution of Zambia (Mar. 1-10, 1996)
[hereinafter Citizens Convention on Draft Constitution of Zambia]; see also Zambia: Elections and Human
Rights, supra note 220, at 13.
261. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, ZAMBIA: No MODEL FOR DEMOCRACY 24 (1998).
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commissions are often staffed by people sympathetic to the ruling party.2 62
Moreover, on practical grounds, the use of a commission with a broad and
unregimented agenda to collect constitutional proposals is inappropriate for the
elaboration of a complex document such as a constitution.
A major drawback of the African commission method is that people come
to the commission hearings and voice their unguided opinions about what they
individually consider to be constitutionally significant. 263 Typically, the issues
that they address are not appropriate for inclusion in a national constitution. A
large number of petitioners take advantage of the process to air grievances
relating to issues like unemployment, land allocation, lack of schools or health
264care, inadequate transport facilities, and development. Questions of
relevance are glossed over for political reasons, expediency, or decorum. 265
This scenario provides an opportunity for the government in power to
26
manipulate the constitutional process. 66 Moreover, with thousands of
submissions, an average lawyer could easily write and find justification for any
submissions made to the commission.2 67
South Africa and Namibia stand out as unique in the process they adopted
in elaborating their national constitutions, and provide an alternative to the
commission method. 268 In both countries, democratically elected constitutional
assemblies adopted and elaborated a national constitution.269 This process
ensured that before each country's constitution was adopted, there were
extensive consultations with all the principal stakeholders in the respective
countries. 270 As these experiences reflect, it is imperative that a broad spectrum
262. See Citizens Convention on Draft Constitution of Zambia, supra note 260.
263. See generally Constitutional Review Commission, Zambia, supra note 253.
264. See, e.g., id. at 84; see also What the People Said: Mashonaland Central Provincial Report on Findings
From the Outreach Programme (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter What the People Said].
265. See, What the People Said, supra note 264.
266. Cf Constitutional Review Commission, Zambia, supra note 253 (providing that the President
appointed some members of the commission, while others were appointed by the President on the
recommendations of organizations and institutions).
267. See id (noting the large numbers of participants in commission discussions).
268. See generally Jill Cottrell, The Constitution of Namibia: An Overview, 35 J. AFR. L 56 (1991);
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 224; END OF APARTHEID, supra note 142;
A Democratic, Non-Racial and United South Africa, supra note 218; cf NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, NATION BUILDING: THE U.N. AND NAMIBIA 26 (1990).
269. Hassen Ebrahim, The Process of Drafting South Africa's New Constitution, paper presented at the
International Roundtable on Democratic Constitution Development Conference, Pretoria, S. Afr. (July 17-20,
1995).
270. See supra note 249 for a description of the South African public's reaction to the efforts of the
Constitutional Assembly in this regard.
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of people have an opportunity to discuss and voice their opinions as to the
appropriate form of constitutional arrangements to govern their country. 271 In
Africa, the difficult question is how to do this effectively so as to prevent the
manipulation of the system by the party in power. The South African
experience teaches us that, in order to engage the widest possible segment of
the population and to make the widest possible consultations meaningful, the
method of consultation must include meaningful and open discussions.2 2 An
appropriate strategy would be to have a group of experts, representative of all
the political parties operating in the country, and the other stakeholders draw up
constitutional principles to guide the elaboration of a constitution and a draft
constitution. The draft should be informed by theme committees set up as part
of the constitution-making structure to facilitate public participation in the
273exercise. For example, the South African constitution was organized along
the following six themes: character of democratic state; structure of
government; relationship between levels of government; fundamental rights;
judiciary and legal systems; and specialized structures of government.274
The main task of the committees would typically be to gather, collate, and
refine the views of the political parties and the public. The draft constitution,
as established by the constitution-making body, should be based on a list of
constitutional principles established and agreed to by all the stakeholders prior
to drafting. The draft should also be accompanied by commentaries on each of
the specific provisions analyzing the various aspects, highlighting options, and
identifying problems that might arise. The adoption of the constitution should
be by consensus and every effort should be made to achieve that. It is not wise
to adopt constitutional provisions through voting, as that tends to be divisive.
The resulting document should then be subjected to public scrutiny and analysis
in a forum such as an assembly, specifically elected to elaborate a constitution.
This approach would structure the ensuing debate along specific constitutional
themes. The existence of a draft would limit the parameters of discussion to
constitutional issues and avoid petitioners addressing the commission on every
aspect of human endeavor.
271. See Ebrahim, supra note 269.
272. See id.
273. South Africa adopted this method. See DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, supra note
176, at 3-4.
274. See Ebrahim, supra note 269.
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X. THE ADOPTION AND ENACTMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION
After a draft constitution is elaborated, the next issue is how to adopt and
enact the constitution into law so as to give it maximum legitimacy. The
supreme law of the land should not be adopted using the same procedures as
those that are available for ordinary legislation. 275 A constitution should have
sanctity, and should not lightly be subject to amendments.276 In Africa, in the
post-colonial period, two methods have been used in adopting constitutions:
adoption through a two-thirds majority in Parliament, and adoption through a
constituent assembly or national referendum.
It could be argued that the adoption of the constitution through a
constituent assembly or referendum is unnecessary, as the enactment of a
constitution is the preserve of the legislature.277 Whether or not the legislature
has power to enact a constitution is not the issue, however. The real question
is: how do you ensure that the sovereign will of the people on which the edifice
of democracy rests is included in the process of producing a legitimate,
credible, and enduring constitution? If anything, the process of consulting the
people strengthens parliament, as it implies an unequivocal acceptance of the
fact that parliament's powers are delegated to it by the people. The relationship
between parliament and the people can only endure where it is recognized and
accepted that the people are supreme. Therefore, in matters of great national
importance, such as the adoption of a national constitution, parliament must
defer to the wishes of the people who, after all, are the source of popular
sovereignty. 27 A successful constitution is one that obtains legitimization by
popular will. 279 Popular democracy demands the institutionalization of a
culture of consultation and reciprocal control with regard to lawmaking and the
use of power and privileges. The adoption of a constitution through a
referendum is one of the most transparent ways of furthering the culture of
consultation in a democracy.
275. See Constitutional Review Commission, Zambia, supra note 253, § 27.0.
276. Most African constitutions allow for the amendment of the constitution with a two-thirds majority.
See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF ZAMBIA ACT, art. 84(2)(b) (1991). This is not a significant constraint and is one
that is easily obtained in systems where the opposition is often taken.
277. The Govemment of Zambia argued that way with respect to the 1996 Constitution. See REPUBLIC OF
ZAMBIA, THE MWANAKATWE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW COMMISSION SUPPLEMENT No. 1 (1995).
278. See B.O. NWABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 135 (1973) (relating an
example from Nigeria of the consequences of not deferring to the wishes of the population when making
changes in government).
279. See id. at 25.
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Furthermore, requiring a two-thirds vote in parliament to approve a
constitution is not an effective safeguard against the adoption of an unpopular
or unfair constitution or amendments. The two-thirds majority requirement is
often within the reach of the largest party in parliament, especially in a winner-
take-all electoral system.280 The requirement is therefore, in practice, not much
more than the simple majority required for ordinary lawmaking. In order to
safeguard democracy, much more should be required to effect a constitutional
amendment than the will of the majority party in parliament. Popular
consultation in the form of a referendum should in fact be entrenched in
African constitutional practice as a mechanism for obtaining the mandate of the
people on constitutional matters and as a deterrent to frequent amendments. In
addition, the public's involvement in the constitution-making process can be an
educational experience, enabling them to focus on the contents of the
constitution in a manner they would not have otherwise done. To discourage
amendments, the Namibia Constitution has adopted a novel approach: it
provides that the bill of rights provisions in the constitution may not be
diminished or detracted from through amendments, and any such purported
repeal or amendment shall be invalid.281 Recent attempts in Namibia to amend
the constitution and remove the two-term limitation on the presidency in order
to facilitate a third term for the incumbent President are regrettable, and can
serve only to undermine the sanctity of the Namibian constitution and the
development of democracy in that country.282
X1. STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND GOVERNANCE
The most recent economic initiative on Africa, the New Partnership on
African Development (NEPAD), has recognized that development "has, as one
of its foundations, the expansion of democratic frontiers and the deepening of
the culture of human rights. ''283 The discussions in the previous sections of this
paper have demonstrated the enormous challenges that Africa faces in its efforts
to achieve democratic governance and economic development. They include
the need to develop durable constitutions, build institutions that can effectively
280. See Ndulo & Kent, supra note 248, at 264.
281. NAMiB. CONST. (1989) art. 131.
282. See DAILY MAIL & GuARDIAN NEWSPAPER (Johannesburg, S. Afr.), Oct. 31, 1998 [hereinafter MAIL
& GUARDIAN].
283. Ravi Kanbur, The New Partnershipfor Africa 's Development (NEPAD): An Initial Commentary, 29
POLITIKON 87, 91 (2002).
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govern the countries and resolve conflicts, devolve power to local communities,
and develop electoral systems that guarantee effective representation. The
challenges cannot be met in conditions of poverty and scarce resources.28 4 The
poverty, weak institutions, and conflict, described in the preceding sections, are
worsened by the structural adjustment programs that have been put in place in
African countries by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.285
Economic reforms, culminating in privatization, encapsulate how a
combination of excessive deregulation and a lack of balancing safeguards have
worsened poverty and deprived governments of the resources required to build
strong national institutions, including political parties, that promote democracy
and development.286  Structural adjustment programs demand that African
countries, irrespective of their level of development and industrial base, should
liberalize their trade regimes in order to expand production and exports, and
consequently promote their economic development. 287 That is, they should
integrate into the global economy. There are definitely huge benefits to
globalization. Increased trade has given consumers and producers a wide
choice of low-cost goods. It leads to more efficient use of global resources.
Greater access to world markets allows countries to exploit their comparative
advantages more intensely. Increased capital and investment flows raise capital
in countries able to attract them. However, the abilities of investment capital to
seek out the most efficient markets, and of producers and consumers to access
the most competitive sources, expose and intensify existing structural
weaknesses in individual economies. With the speedy flow of information, the
margins of maneuvering for domestic policy are much reduced.
Because African countries have failed to participate in the global economy,
they have been marginalized.288 Their role in international trade in terms of
their share in world trade and output has decreased dramatically.289 In many
284. A World Bank Report has observed, "[a]t the start of the 19th Century, Africa's income level stood at
roughly one-third of Europe's." CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21 ST CENTURY?, supra note 80, at 18; see also
THANDIKA MKANDAWIRE & CHARLES C. SOLUDO, AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT:
OUR CONTINENT OUR FUTURE 1-20 (1999). See generally PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY, supra note 74.
285. See MKANDAWIRE & SOLUDO, supra note 284, at 49-85; see also AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE
FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at i. See generally Adedeji & Husain, supra note 74.
286. See MKANDAWIRE & SOLUDO, supra note 284, at 21-40.
287. See id.
288. See id. at xi.
289. A World Bank report observes, "Africa's share ofworld trade has plummeted since the 1960s: it now
accounts for less than 2 percent of world trade. Three decades ago, African countries were specialized in
primary products and highly trade dependent. But Africa missed out on industrial expansion and now risks
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African countries, rapid expansion of exports requires the development of
supply capacity and diversification of manufactured goods for export, which in
turn requires increased investment. 290 An export industrial base requires a wide
and modem production structure. In part due to the colonial legacy, the
majority of African countries lack such structures, and production is based on
simple processing and traditional industries.29' There is also the problem of
protectionism in the West. Wolfenson, the World Bank President, has "urged




He has argued for market access and a level playing field for African products
and goods.293 The result is that the structural reform programs have been less
than successful in stimulating expansion, and instead have created untold
hardships for the majority of the people.2 94  Consequently, cash-strapped
economies and governments are not able to fund the various institutions of
government adequately. Oxfam has observed that in Zambia "there has been a
catastrophic decline in overall levels of funding of social sectors in real terms
which has been exacerbated by the austerity measures demanded by the World
Bank and IMF.
295
Moreover, the effects on poor economies are compounded by the adverse
296impact of the debt burden. Africa is the only region in the world where debt
has exceeded GNP since 1990; the ratio stood at 124 percent in 1991. The debt
problem is so extreme in some countries that annual debt service today actually
being excluded from the global information revolution." CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21 ST CENTURY?, supra
note 80, at 8.
290. THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD BANK BRIEF: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, at http:I/
www.worldbank.org/afr/africabrief pdf.
291. See CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY?, supra note 80, at 3 (emphasizing the need to invest in
people if poverty is to be reduced).
292. PeaceLink, Africa News Bulletin, June 6, 2002, available at http://www.peacelink.it/anb-bia/
week_2k2/020606a.htm; see also James D. Wolfensohn, Africa: An Urgent Agenda, Speech Delivered at the
InterAction Forum (June 4, 2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/speeches.
293. See Africa Fine-Tunes Development Plan, BBC NEWS, June 6,2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
business/2024827.stm.
294. This failure has been admitted by the World Bank. See Interview with Robert Calderisi, World Bank's
External Affairs Manager for Africa, DAILY MAIL AND GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER, March 31, 1999.
295. See OxFAM, GLOBALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 2 (undated).
296. The World Bank has acknowledged that "[rlapid enrollment growth in higher education, coupled with
declining resources, has significantly lowered quality." CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21 ST CENTURY?, supra note
80, at 106; Thandika Mkandawire and Charles Soludo have observed, "[tihe consequences of debt overhang
to the macroeconomy are monumental, and meaningful growth is unlikely to resume without a resolution to
the debt crisis ... First, the rising debt-service ratios ... reduce the availability of resources for initiating
growth. Second, in the face of stagnating exports, rising debt-service payments have entailed either payment
defaults or a drain on scarce foreign exchange needed to import production inputs." MKANDAWIRE &
SOLUDO, supra note 284, at 121.
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exceeds their total foreign exchange earnings. 291 More than twenty-five
African countries have debt burdens regarded by the World Bank as
unsustainable; in 1992 the discounted present value of their debt service was
more than 200 percent of exports. Whatever process was originally at fault for
the situation, it is simply unreasonable and unrealistic to demand that the debt
be serviced. For countries where the ratio is 1,000 percent or more, such as
Mozambique, Sudan, and Somalia, the situation is almost surreal, as the
compounding of interest pushes servicing obligations to stratospheric levels.298
As a result, the development and the strengthening of democratic institutions is
threatened by the failure of government to maintain budget allocations in the
face of economic decline and the need to divert domestic resources to meet debt
servicing requirements. The result is that many institutions are dependent on
donor funding. For instance, the 2001 elections in Zambia could not have been
held without European Union funding.299  Institutions such as the Anti-
Corruption Commission and the Human Rights Commission depend on donor
funding for as much as ninety percent of their budgets. Even in the case of
South Africa, as a Human Rights Watch researcher observed, "although South
Africa, of all the African nations, has the requisite resources and technology to
be able to compete in the world market, given that globalization process is
driven by inequality, it threatens to worsen inequality in the world and thus
destabilize the political and economic reconstruction process.
'300
The problem is exacerbated by the austerity measures demanded by the
World Bank and the IMF. The protection of relative social expenditure must be
viewed in relation to the massive absolute reduction in public spending
simultaneously insisted upon by the same institutions. Stabilization measures
often required of governments include strict cash budgeting, and the
297. See Shalebda Sharma, Book Review, Fletcher F. World Ass. 165 (1996) (reviewing AFRICA'S
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES: BETWEEN DESPAIR AND HOPE).
298. Seeid. See also the case of Tanzania, where the government spends four times as much per capita on
debt servicing as it does on primary education. See OXFAM, FROM UNSUSTAINABLE DEBT TO POVERTY
REDUCTION: REFORMING THE HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES INITIATIVE (1991), at http://
www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers. Another example is Mozambique, where debt servicing for 1997 absolved
around half of government revenue, or $7 per capita. This is compared to $3 per capita spent on health. The
effect of this has been that approximately 190,000 child deaths and 10, 000 maternal deaths can be linked to
shortages of basic drugs and inadequate access to health services. See generally Shridath Ramphal, DebtHas
a Child's Face: Children Pay the Price, at http://www.unicef.org/pon99/debtcom2.htm.
299. See EU to Provide Funds for Zambia's General Elections, PANAFRICA NEWS AGENCY, at http://
allafrica.com/stories/200012110181 .html; EU Statement on the Zambia 2001 Elections, THE MONITOR, Feb.
8-11, 2002, at http://afronet.org.za/monitor203/report.htm.
300. See OXFAM, supra note 295, at 2.
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establishment of limits on the amount of money the government borrows for
public expenditure-public sector borrowing requirements. The apparent
abdication of governments' power to control and determine their own national
economic policies is one of the most visible consequences of globalization in
African countries. In particular, it seems that African governments no longer
have the power to determine their own development or political policies.
Unemployment, slumps, higher levels of poverty, and social unrest are evident
all over Africa, as is the AIDS pandemic.30  This social unrest results in
political instability. When there is political instability, the government is
constantly challenged, and where there is political instability democracy cannot
flourish. Poverty affects the individual's capacity to exercise political,
economic, and cultural rights. The individual's ability to participate in political
activities is greatly undermined. In that sense, globalization poses a huge
challenge to democratization. The poor cannot even think of their rights,
because survival is foremost in their minds. The polarization of income
therefore further aggravates already prevalent human rights violations in the
form of poverty, gender inequalities, and exploitation of children.
CONCLUSION
Some have expressed skepticism at the viability of democracy in African
societies given their deep ethnic divisions; widespread illiteracy; lack of a
sizeable middle class; lack of a vibrant civil society; and lack of a political
culture of tolerance, debate, and compromise in the face of the huge economic
and environmental hardships that confront Africa.3 °2 As observed, Africa's
economic conditions are exacerbated by the debt crisis. 3° 3 When this is added
to demographic and cultural problems, some ask whether democracy can take
root in Africa at all.3 4 In response, there is already substantial evidence that
301. See U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION ON HIV/AIDS, DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT ON
HIV/AIDS 6 (2001).
302. For example, Wing, who has expressed doubts of Africa's ability to establish democratic governance in
conditions of poverty, suggests that in such conditions there would be an inevitable scramble for scarce
resources, even if all citizens were of the same ethnicity, and he wonders whether democracy can exist-much
less flourish-in such an environment. See Wing, supra note 14, at 691, 701-02. Such a view ignores the
link between good governance and development. Cf Carol Lancaster, Democracy in Africa, 85 FOREIGN
POL'Y 148-49 (1991-92).
303. OXFAM, supra note 295.
304. See Adrien K. Wing, Towards Democracy in a New South Africa: A Review of Ziyad Motala
Constitutional Options for a Democratic South Africa, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 762 (1995).
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democratic institutions can prosper, and indeed are prospering, on the African
continent.305  Africans publicly claim to be committed to democratic
governance. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) states
clearly that the foundation of the program is the expansion of the frontiers of
democracy and the deepening of the culture of human rights. There is
continent-wide acceptance of multi-party systems and of the direct link between
306good governance and development.
The future of democracy in Africa depends on the development of political
systems that give people a sense of ownership of the political process. The
transition from authoritarianism to greater participation in political
decisionmaking requires determined long-term efforts and a huge investment in
the development of institutions. This transition cannot succeed unless the
economic conditions in African countries improve and develop to a level where
they are able to sustain the institutions necessary for good governance.
Structural adjustment programs and the world trading system must give greater
priority to social and economic development if the right climate for the
development of democracy in Africa is to be created.
305. Botswana, South Africa, Mauritius, Ghana, and Benin are good examples of thriving democracies.
306. See The Harare Commonwealth Declaration, supra note 152. The majority of the member countries
are African States.
